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1.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Remittance transfers to developing countries have grown dramatically over the past two 
decades and have generated considerable excitement in recent years over their potential 
to aid growth and development. Armenia is a case of a small economy facing poor 
economic fundamentals that possesses a very large diaspora community and receives 
large remittance inflows. There is considerable interest in the donor community as to 
whether these remittance inflows can be increased and their impacts on growth and 
development enhanced. This report seeks to define remittances appropriately in the 
Armenian context, evaluate their size and importance to the economy, evaluate their 
macroeconomic and microeconomic impacts, and propose initiatives in light of this 
analysis to leverage remittances for developmental goals.  
 
There is some confusion in the remittance literature over what a proper definition of 
remittances should be. We argue that remittances should be defined as the sum of flows 
from non-emigrant temporary workers and longer-term emigrants. Most remittance 
studies use data only on the latter, and sometimes only on a portion of the latter. We 
describe the recommended methodologies for estimating remittances in the balance of 
payments and review the official Armenian numbers in detail. The Armenian National 
Statistical Service (NSS) uses data on formal-sector wire transfers and also remittance 
income as captured in a household survey. It thus covers to at least some degree informal-
sector remittance flows. We develop alternative estimates of remittance flows using data 
from an informal survey that we carried out of Armenian diasporans in several European 
and Russian cities, an NSS survey of travelers, and migration data. The official estimate 
of remittance inflows was $289m in 2003, whereas our alternative estimate equals 
roughly $900m. Because we examined the official estimate in great detail, we were able 
to identify where it was most off the mark. The biggest error is due to a methodological 
mistake that can be rectified at little cost. The true importance of remittances to the 
Armenian economy is much higher that the ratio of official remittances to GDP (10%) 
and could be three times as important as that. In addition to shedding light on the size and 
importance of remittances in Armenia, we believe that the insights gained on how 
remittance data are constructed will be useful generally to the remittance literature. 
 
Formal and informal Armenian remittance transfer channels are then evaluated. Our 
informal survey of diasporans surprisingly revealed that formal financial channels are 
much more widely used by Armenians transmitting from Russia than from western 
Europe. Two new transfer systems, Anelik and Unistream, have appeared in the CIS that 
have significantly lowered transactions costs and encouraged remittance transmission 
through formal channels. Although trust and confidence in the banking system continues 
to be low for several reasons, there are positive trends in the use of formal transfer 
channels, at least with regard to remittances coming from the CIS. Transactions costs for 
these remittances are significantly below the costs for remittances coming from the USA, 
Canada, or Europe. Reducing transfer fees to even lower levels might have a negative 
impact on the banking system, as many Armenian banks significantly depend on transfer 
fee income. There is very little empirical evidence on the degree of access that different 
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population groups have to the formal financial system, and it is not yet clear that poor and 
rural households have low rates of access.  
 
Evaluation of the economic impacts of remittances begins with a contemporary 
assessment of the costs and benefits of remittance transfers on the economy. The 
theoretical and empirical literature on remittances is extensive, and we review key 
debates on the economics of migration and remittances and the large body of evidence 
that has accumulated to date. Older views that remittances were undesirable due to their 
being spent primarily on consumption and thus acting as a drag on development are no 
longer tenable. The “new theory of migration” argues that decisions on migration and 
remittances are made in the context of a household behaving rationally and taking 
collective decisions in the pursuit of individual interests. One implication of this is that 
there will be a high propensity to save out of many remittance flows, as they are 
transitory rather than permanent income, and empirical studies confirm this strongly. 
Remittances can thus be expected to enhance capital accumulation. Evidence on the use 
of remittances suggests that they are saved mostly into housing, land, education, and 
small business. Little remittance income appears to flow into the formal financial sector 
as savings. Evidence also suggests that remittances have a negative impact on labor 
supply of adults and a positive impact on education. There is little evidence available on 
the overall impact of remittances on growth and development. One recent study shows 
that remittances have a negative overall impact, but more research is required. 
 
Remittances are likely to reduce poverty, and empirical research shows that they do. It is 
less clear what their impact on inequality is. Some empirical studies show that they 
increase it, and other studies that they reduce it. We use data from the 2002 Armenian 
household survey to characterize the households that received remittance flows and 
evaluate their impact on inequality. In Armenia, remittances reduce inequality, because 
the households that receive them would otherwise be at very low levels of income. 
According to income data reported to the survey, for households receiving remittances, 
remittances make up 80% of household income on average. Remittances do appear to be 
going to some of the most vulnerable households in Armenia. We also find that the same 
percentage of urban and rural households received remittances, but that rural households 
received relatively more remittances from CIS countries and relatively less from the USA 
and Canada. 
 
The report concludes with a series of recommendations on initiatives that could be 
undertaken to enhance the knowledge base on remittances and their economic impacts in 
Armenia, increase the supply of remittances and their allocation to uses facilitating 
growth and development, enhance linkages with the diasporan communities more 
generally, and coordinate donor activities.  
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2.  REMITTANCES IN ARMENIA: DEFINITION, MEASUREMENT, AND 
IMPORTANCE TO THE ECONOMY 
 
2.1  Definition of Remittances 
 
Remittances are classically defined as monetary funds sent by individuals working 
abroad to recipients in the country that they came from. Underlying the definition of 
remittances are several theoretical considerations that should inform what monetary flows 
are included in it: 
• Who is the sender of the resources? Remittances could include only funds from 
those working temporarily abroad, or also from those who have permanently 
emigrated and become legal residents of another country. We feel that funds sent 
from an individual or household in a foreign country to a household in Armenia 
should be included in remittances, and the sender and receiver do not have to be 
part of the same family; 
• Who decides how the resources are used? Funds should be counted as remittances 
only if the receiving household has full authority to decide on how the funds are 
used. This definition includes cases where the sender is part of the receiving 
household and participates in decision-making. 
 
Our definition of remittances thus includes all funds sent by diasporan Armenians, 
whether “new” or “old” diaspora, to households in Armenia without the intervention of a 
third-party institution making decisions on amount and allocation (use) of funds. 
Humanitarian assistance is ruled out, because although it is sent to households and 
supports consumption, it is channeled through state or non-household institutions. In-kind 
household-to-household transfers should be included, as the recipient household 
presumably has influence over what is sent. 
 
2.2  Measurement of Remittances 
 
Different approaches are taken in different studies of remittances to defining and 
measuring remittance transfers.1 Remittances are inherently difficult to reliably measure. 
Most analysts use official balance of payments (BOP) or central bank data on remittances 
that are usually constructed using data on wire transfer flows officially reported by 
financial-sector institutions. Remittance estimates derived from officially-reported wire 
transfers are widely regarded as underestimating actual remittance flows. We will refer 
henceforth to remittances not captured in official BOP statistics as informal remittances. 
The table below summarizes how two studies approached remittance measurement: 
                                                 
1 Swamy (1981) gives a comprehensive overview of how official remittances are measured and the 
problems of these estimates. 
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Table 2.1 
Paper and Country Definition of 
“remittances” 
Source of data Method of calculation 
Mellyn (2003), 
Philippines 
“Total funds sent by 
individuals resident 
abroad to recipients in 
the Philippines through 
both formal and informal 
channels” 
Formal flows: commercial 
bank remittance activity 
 
Formal + informal flows: 
data from Money Transfer 
Association on average 
value of US-Philippines 
transfer 
Formal flows: value of commercial 
bank remittance activity 
 
Formal + informal flows: stock of 
overseas resident Filipinos times 
average transfer value from Money 
Transfer Association 
Uruci and Gedeshi 
(2003), Albania 
(not explicitly defined) Official balance of 
payments data 
“Difference btwn. foreign currency 
coming in (goods and service 
exports, credits, FDI) and foreign 
currency going out (goods and 
services imports, foreign currency 
going out through the banking 
system” 
 
These two cases describe classic situations for developing/transition countries. In the case 
of the Phillipines, official BOP statistics do distinguish remittance flows and provide 
direct estimates of them but fail to capture a large informal flow. In the case of Albania, 
official data is so poor that remittances are not identified as a distinct category, and 
analysts are forced to estimate them as a sort of “grand BOP residual,” a very imperfect 
measure. 
 
There is some confusion in the remittance literature on how remittances are actually 
measured in the BOP.2 There are at least two categories of monetary inflows that could 
conceivably comprise a proper measure of remittances. The first category is a measure of 
remittances made by a country’s residents temporarily working abroad, which we will 
call non-emigrant remittances. These are transfers sent by workers who do not become 
residents of the country in which they are temporarily working. Most definitions of 
remittances in the literature exclude these flows, probably because they are not 
considered to be transfer payments between long-term separated entities. As we will see, 
part of non-emigrant remittances do in fact consist of such transfer flows to the family in 
the home country, and part do not. A case can be made that even the latter flows should 
also be included in a definition of remittances that is meaningful from the viewpoint of 
economic theory. 
 
Measurement of non-emigrant remittances in the BOP is done on the basis of recording 
the income that the workers earn and the expenditures that they make, and subtracting 
expenditures from income: 
  
                                                 
2 Discussion of recording remittances in official BOP statistics is based on Balance of Payments Manual 
(Fifth Edition), International Monetary Fund (1993.) 
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Table 2.2   Non-Emigrant Remittance Accounting 
Income or Expenditure Item Where Is It Recorded in the BOP? 
Income of non-emigrant workers 
Wages and salaries, other non-investment 
incomes 
Recorded in “Income – Compensation of 
employees including border, seasonal and other 
workers” as a BOP credit (inflow) 
Investment income derived from 
investments in host country 
Recorded in “Income – Investment” as a BOP 
credit (inflow) 
Expenditures of non-emigrant workers 
Personal expenditures (food, clothing, rent, 
etc.) 
Recorded in “Travel – Business” as a BOP debit 
(outflow) 
Tax and social payments to host-country 
government 
Recorded in “Current Transfers – General 
Government” as a BOP debit (outflow) 
Income – Expenditures 
This is the measure of remittance flows of 
non-emigrant workers 
Should be recorded in the financial account of the 
BOP in “Reserve Assets” or some other 
appropriate category 
 
Estimates of non-emigrant remittances could be formed by estimating worker incomes 
and expenditures through use of survey data on these workers. However, such data often 
does not exist or is not regularly collected, and the only observable, regularly-collectable 
data available is on money transfers made through the formal financial sector. Statistics 
authorities will back out an estimate of income and expenditures from the transfer data by 
multiplying it by given factors that are presumably derived from surveys or are 
“reasonable guesses.”3 
 
The second category in the BOP that should be included in any definition of remittances 
is what we will call emigrant remittances, which are remittances sent by people 
working in other countries who are classified as resident in those countries. For example, 
in the Armenian case, these would be Armenians working in Russia and other countries 
who have left Armenia for more than one year and are no longer classified as being 
resident in Armenia. Emigrant remittances are recorded in the BOP statistics as “Current 
transfers – workers remittances” as a BOP credit (inflow.)4 
 
In a specific country case, remittance flows may also be included in other categories in 
the BOP, or the BOP may contain special categories that are not usually included. This is 
true in the case of Armenia. Armenian statistical authorities include in the current 
transfers part of the BOP a category labeled “Diaspora” that is unique to its BOP. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The IMF Balance of Payments Manual cites various factors that could be used.. 
4 It is important to note that some studies on remittances are misled by the somewhat confusing 
terminology used in the BOP statistics and treat only these inflows as remittances, as they are explicitly 
labeled “workers remittances.” However, these flows are often only a small part of the flows associated 
with temporary (non-emigrant) workers.  
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2.3  Armenian Remittance Flows: Official Data 
 
In order to understand how remittances are calculated in the Armenian BOP, it is 
important to note that the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia (NSS) 
classifies Armenians working abroad into three types: 
• Non-emigrant (temporary/seasonal) workers: those working less than 1 year 
abroad; 
• Emigrant workers: those working for over 1 year but less than 2 years; 
• Diaspora: those who have been outside Armenia for over 2 years. 
 
Armenian remittance flows are measured in the BOP using a variety of different data 
sources. Non-emigrant worker remittance flows are measured using data on both 
monetary transfers through the formal financial sector and data from the Armenian 
household survey, which is discussed at length in chapter 4. There are two key sources of 
data used to estimate the incomes of non-emigrant workers: 
 
• The Central Bank provides the National Statistical Service of the Republic of 
Armenia (NSS) with data on monetary transfers through four financial 
institutions: Anelik Bank, Unibank, Western Union, and MoneyGram (see chapter 
3 for more details on these institutions.) The value of this flow is divided into a 
consumption transfer flow and an investment transfer flow using data from a 
special irregular household survey.5 The investment flow is included in the 
foreign direct investment item of the BOP. The consumption flow is used as a 
basis for estimating non-emigrant worker incomes; 
• The Armenian household survey collects data on transfer flows that Armenian 
households receive from family members abroad. These flows include both 
money and goods. The NSS breaks this transfer flow down into a flow from non-
emigrant workers, and emigrant plus diaspora workers. 
  
The NSS adds together the consumption transfer flow derived from the banking data and 
the non-emigrant transfer flow derived from the household survey data, and this sum is 
taken to be non-emigrant worker income.6 It is very important to note that the NSS does 
not adjust, or “gross up,” the flow data to make an estimate of income, but simply equates 
the flows to income. Personal expenditures of non-emigrant workers are calculated on 
the basis of estimates obtained from a published NSS survey of passengers departing and 
arriving in Armenia in 2002. The NSS states that tax and social payments of non-
emigrant workers are assumed to be 20% of income.7 
 
                                                 
5 This survey covered roughly 100 households, was carried out in 1999 and 2002, and has not been 
published by the NSS. 
6 It should also be noted that non-emigrant worker income also includes an estimate of income earned by 
Armenians working in embassies and other governmental organizations abroad. This is a small component 
of the category. 
7 This is an NSS estimate cited to us but about which we were given no explanation or detail. Table 2.3 
shows that the ratio of estimated tax and social payments to estimated gross income is not in fact 20%, 
suggesting that NSS might be using a different methodology. 
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Remittances from emigrant workers and the diaspora are estimated from data on transfers 
collected by the Armenian household survey, and then broken down into emigrant and 
diaspora remittance flows.8 Table 2.3 summarizes official Armenian remittance flows. 
Official remittances have grown at a very rapid pace during 1998-2003. Except for a 
downturn in 2000, they have grown at roughly 20% per annum, and growth accelerated in 
2003: 
 
Table 2.3  Official Data on Remittances to Armenia 
Million USD 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 QI 03 QI 04 
Non-emigrant remittances (seasonal workers): 
Credit : Income - compensation of 
seasonal workers 
 
82.3 
 
79.7 
 
78.2 
 
84.2 
 
120.8 
 
150.9 
 
24.9 
 
44.9 
Debits:         
 Travel, business - personal 
expenditures by seasonal workersA 
 
-13.4 
 
-6.2 
 
-11.5 
 
-11.0 
 
-22.3 
 
-25.6 
 
-4.0 
 
-3.6 
 Current transfers - taxes paid by 
seasonal workersB 
 
-16.5 
 
-15.5 
 
-16.1 
 
-16.6 
 
-17.9 
 
-19.1 
 
-4.1 
 
-6.4 
Remittance flowC 52.4 58.0 50.6 56.6 77.3 106.2 16.8 34.9 
Emigrant remittances: 
Credit: Current transfers, workers 
remittances 
10.1 14.9 9.3 10.2 10.2 9.3 2.0 4.4 
Diaspora transfers: 
Credit: Other transfers – diaspora 70.6 88.0 94.7 114.9 132.9 173.7 30.3 42.1 
         
Total current remittances 133.1 160.9 154.6 181.7 223.7 289.2 49.0 81.3 
  Growth  21% -4% 18% 23% 31%  66% 
         
Memo: 
Capital transfers:D 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 
Source: Official balance of payments data of the Republic of Armenia. 
A : This is recorded in the Armenian balance of payments as “Travel – Business – Other.” The 
item “Travel – Business – Expenditure by Seasonal and Border Workers” is actually expenditure 
by Armenians temporarily traveling abroad to engage in trade (the “suitcase” traders, or 
“chelniki.”) (Communication from National Statistical Service.) 
B : This is recorded in the Armenian balance of payments as “Current transfers – Other sectors – 
Other.” (Communication from National Statistical Service.) 
C : The remittance flow appears in the BOP in the financial account as a reserve increase. 
D : Exports of goods and services minus imports of goods and services. 
E : No capital transfer inflows were recorded in 1998-2003. Inflows have been recorded in 2004 
for the first time. 
 
The NSS goes to great lengths to use the data that is available to it to estimate remittance 
flows according to international compilation and data source standards9, and taking into 
account the constraints that the NSS faces, it is doing well. It relies to the extent possible 
                                                 
8 The estimated diaspora remittance flows definitely includes flows from the “new” diaspora, those who 
left Armenia starting in the 1980s. They also might include flows from the “old” diaspora, as the household 
survey records transfers from all relatives abroad. 
9 As recommended by the IMF in its Balance of Payments Manual. 
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not only on bank transfer data but also on household surveys, which captures (at least in 
part) shadow remittances, and remittances from the “old” and “new” diasporas. Data 
needed to accurately measure remittance flows is expensive to collect on a regular basis, 
and the NSS is making the most of the limited resources at its disposal. 
 
The official estimate of remittances into Armenia is an underestimate of the true flow. 
We make the following observations on the NSS estimates of remittance flows: 
 
• Because the non-emigrant worker transfer flow estimated from banking and 
household survey data is not “grossed up”, the item recorded as compensation of 
seasonal (non-emigrant) workers is not in fact total income, but only a fraction of 
it.10 This methodological error leads to a substantial understatement of the true 
level of remittances. Many seasonal workers do not transfer all of their savings to 
their family in Armenia while they are working abroad, but bring with them upon 
return substantial amounts saved up while working. These amounts will not be 
captured if transfer flows are not “grossed up” into income; 
• Dividing the non-emigrant worker transfer flow estimated from banking transfers 
into a consumption and investment stream, and allocating the investment stream 
to foreign direct investment, is methodologically incorrect. The entire amount 
should be used as a basis for estimating gross income and remittance inflows. The 
current approach underestimates the level of remittance transfers; 
• People sending money to Armenia are using informal channels outside of the 
formal financial system. The NSS estimates are nonetheless picking up at least 
some of these flows, because they rely on household survey data as well as wire 
transfer data. The degree to which the household survey accurately records 
remittances is a key issue and is explored further in chapter 5. 
• In-kind remittance transfers of goods should be included. The household survey 
data on transfers does include non-monetary goods transfers. 
 
2.4  Migrant Transfers: A Missing Piece of the Puzzle 
 
One financial component that could be included in remittances is the stock of cash, other 
financial assets, and real property that emigrants who return to Armenia bring back with 
them. This flow is potentially significant and is supposed to be recorded in the capital 
account of the balance of payments, as “migrants’ transfers.” (In the remittance literature, 
the stock of saved-up cash that a returning emigrant brings back is often referred to as 
“savings.”) It is important to note that in the balance of payments, migrant transfers 
excludes cash and other assets brought back by temporary/seasonal workers: the 
methodology used to calculate remittances of temporary workers should (if properly 
carried out) include these assets. 
 
                                                 
10 The  NSS states explicitly that they do not “gross up” this flow. For more details on grossing up bank 
transfer data to get an income estimate, see the IMF’s Balance of Payment Manual, Volume 3, paragraph 
581 on page 131. 
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Statistical authorities recognize that in practice, this flow is difficult to monitor.11 
Although migrant transfers are not a transfer from one household member to a different 
member, they originate in income earned abroad and are used to finance consumption and 
investment of the household in the home country. We believe that remittances should 
include migrant transfers. Studies for other countries have found evidence that migrant 
transfers are significant.12 
 
In the case of Armenia, it is not clear that statistical authorities regularly monitor 
emigrants’ return and the net wealth that they bring with them. Migrant transfers have not 
been estimated until very recently: table 2.3 gives the first estimate made of these 
transfers in early 2004. The importance of migrant transfers for the Armenian economy 
depends on how many emigrants decide to return and how much net financial wealth on 
average they bring with them. We have no data on either and can only speculate. On the 
one hand, the number of returnees at the present time is likely to be rather low. On the 
other hand, the amount of net wealth they bring with them could be quite significant. If 
10,000 people return a year and bring $10,000 in net wealth each, remittances would go 
up by $100 million. 
 
Another issue in the case of Armenia is how to deal with diasporan families from 
countries like the USA and Iran that are buying second homes in Armenia and living in 
them for part of the year. These numbers are growing and are having noticeable impacts 
on real estate markets. Unless these families become legal residents of Armenia, it seems 
inappropriate to include them in the definition of remittances. 
 
2.5  An Alternative Estimate of Non-Emigrant Remittances 
 
Some studies of remittances attempt to estimate total remittance inflow using data that 
capture both the formal and informal sector. The Philippines study cited above uses data 
on the value of an average remittance to the Philippines and an estimate of the total 
number of overseas Filipino workers to get an estimate of total remittances that is more 
than twice the official value. Korovilas (1999) calculates remittances to Albania using an 
estimate of the emigrant labor stock, an estimate of daily earnings, and an estimate of 
how much of this is sent back as remittances and finds a total value 2 to 3 times as large 
as the official estimate. 
 
We take a similar approach to calculating total Armenian remittance inflows, including 
informal remittances. We conducted an informal survey of diasporan Armenians in 5 
cities, three in western Europe and two in Russia, Moscow and Rostov. In western 
European cities, only longer-term emigrants were interviewed. In Moscow and Rostov, 
both longer-term emigrants and temporary (seasonal) workers were interviewed. The vast 
                                                 
11 See Balance of Payments Manual (Fifth Edition), International Monetary Fund (1993), p.84, 
paragraphs 352-355 for a full discussion of migrants’ transfers. 
12 Durand et al (1996) find for a sample of 5653 households sending someone to work abroad temporarily 
that most migrants brought significant amounts of money back to Mexico with them, and that money 
brought back as a share of the sum of amount remitted and brought back was 34%. Ahlburg and Brown 
(1998) find that Pacific Island migrants working in Australia who intend to return home accumulate much 
higher capital assets than those not intending to return home. 
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majority of Armenian temporary workers go to CIS countries to work, and primarily 
Russia. We use data on temporary workers to estimate non-emigrant remittances. Results 
of our survey of temporary workers provide estimates of the average remittance that these 
workers send home each month, and how much money is brought home at the end of 
their stay:  
 
Table 2.4 
 Skilled 
builders 
Seasonal 
laborers 
Asphalt layers 
Moscow    
  Average amount sent to Armenia per month $150-200 $100 $250 
  Length of stay in Moscow (months) 6 6 4 to 6 
  How much money is taken home at end of trip $3000-4000 $1500-2000 $5000-6000 
Rostov    
  Average amount sent to Armenia per month $150-200 $100 NA 
  Length of stay in Rostov (months) 6 6 NA 
  How much money is taken home at end of trip $2000-3000 $1000-1800 NA 
Source: interviews with temporary laborers conducted on the street, discussions with crew chiefs. 
 
On the basis of this data, we estimate both the remittances sent home by temporary 
workers while they are abroad, and the amount that they bring back with them. We begin 
with an estimate of the former. The Armenian Government does not keep track of how 
many Armenians are leaving to work abroad on a temporary or long-term basis. Data 
from a special survey of travelers entering and leaving Armenia in 2002 show that almost 
all Armenians traveling to work abroad are headed for Russia or Ukraine: 
 
Table 2.5 
Destination of Armenians Leaving to Work Abroad in April-June 2002 
Russia GeorgiaA Ukraine USA Turkey Iran Belarus 
Other 
CountriesB
1718 174 111 36 33 26 21 89 
78% 8% 5% 2% 1% 1% 1% 4% 
Source: NSS, “Survey of Arriving and Departing Passengers in April-June 2002” 
A : Most workers leaving for Georgia were “suitcase” traders (“chelniki”) 
B : Greece, France, Uzbekistan, UAE, Turkmenistan, Canada, Spain, UK, Poland, Kazakhstan, 
Czech Republic, India, Italy, Bulgaria, Germany, Sweden, BiH, Belgium 
 
We assume that all temporary workers are going to Russia. In order to estimate how 
many Armenian went to work abroad temporarily in a recent year, we use 2003 data on 
the total number of exit trips from Armenia for each quarter of the year that are available 
from official migration statistics (see appendix.) The survey of travelers cited above 
suggests that in the second quarter of the year, slightly over half (55%) of these exits 
were for temporary work purposes. Percentages for the other three quarters are arbitrarily 
estimated based on the fact that most temporary workers leave in the second and third 
quarters, and vacation travelers peak in the third quarter. We must also estimate the 
percentage of those going abroad to work who are temporary workers and those who are 
longer-term emigrants. There is no direct data available on these percentages; given that 
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entry and exit data for 2003 suggest that roughly 10,000 people left the country long-term 
that year, percentages were chosen that follow a reasonable seasonal pattern and that 
result in an outflow of longer-term emigrants of 46000. Table 2.6 summarizes the 
estimate of 179443 temporary workers in 2003, which is conservative. 
 
Table 2.6 
 Q I Q II Q III Q IV 2003 
  Number of exit trips from Armenia 114,501 156,500 209,428 148,080 628,509 
    Fraction that were going abroad for work 25% 55% 35% 25%  
    Of which were temporary/seasonal workers 60% 90% 90% 50%  
    Non-emigrant (temporary) workers 17,175 77,788 65,970 18,510 179,443 
 
Memo: Longer-term emigrants 
 
11,450 
 
8,643 
 
7,330 
 
18,510 
 
45,933 
              -as % of total exits 10.0% 5.5% 3.5% 12.5% 7.3% 
Source: number of exit trips from Armenia (all transport types): State Department for Migration 
and Refugees, “Number of Persons Arrived and Left in Armenia,” data posted on web site: 
http://www.dmr.am. For other variables, see text. Numbers that are arbitrary estimates are in 
italics.  
 
Table 2.7 gives the total value of remittance flows from temporary workers under 
different assumptions on average monthly remittance sent home and average duration of 
stay of a temporary worker. The estimates that most closely correspond to the 
information on average remittance amount and duration of stay gathered in our informal 
survey of temporary workers in Moscow and Rostov are highlighted in bold; numbers 
exceeding the official remittance estimate of $106 million are italicized. Our most 
plausible estimates of $135-179m are somewhat above the NSS official estimate. An 
overall impression from table 2.7 is that the official estimate of temporary-worker 
remittances somewhat understates their true magnitude, but not to a dramatic degree. 
 
Table 2.7 
Average monthly remittance sent home Average 
duration of stay 
(months) 
$100 
 
$150 
 
$200 
 
$250 
 
3 $54m $88m $108m $135m 
4 $72m $101m $144m $179m 
5 $90m $135m $179m $224m 
6 $108m $161m $215m $269m 
7 $126m $188m $251m $314m 
 
However, the NSS is not measuring how much money temporary workers are bringing 
back to Armenia upon their return.13 Using the estimate of number of temporary workers 
for 2003 and a conservative range of money brought back by an average worker of 
$2000-4000 based on evidence from our informal survey, roughly $359-538 million is 
                                                 
13 Due to the fact that the NSS does not “gross up” estimated remittance transfer flows into temporary-
worker income. 
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brought back by temporary workers.14 This greatly exceeds the official estimate, which 
should according to BOP methodology include money brought back. An important 
conclusion is that the major inaccuracy in official Armenian statistics of non-emigrant 
remittances is not estimating return-trip inflows. Including these inflows results in a non-
emigrant remittance flow that is 5-7 times larger the officially-estimated amount. 
 
2.6  An Alternative Estimate of Emigrant and Disaporan Remittances  
 
Our informal survey of diasporan Armenians conducted interviews with 166 individuals 
in five cities in western Europe and Russia.15 We estimate the size of an average monthly 
transfer at roughly $200. Interestingly, $200 is typically cited as an average remittance 
transaction value for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean:16 
 
Table 2.8 
 London Bruxelles Paris Moscow Rostov Total 
Number of interviews 32 16 29 53 36 166 
Average size of monthly transfer $204 $161 $131 $217 $279 $208 
Source: interviews with diasporan Armenians. Interviews were conducted on the basis of random 
encounters in cafes, banks and other institutions and permitted to “snowball” (one encounter 
leading to another.) 
 
There are two ways that we can attempt to estimate aggregate emigrant and diasporan 
remittance flows. We can follow the example of other studies and use an estimate of 
emigrants and diasporans sending money to Armenia. An estimate of the total population 
of Armenians by country is available (see appendix.) However, we have no information 
on what percentage of each population is sending remittances. We therefore use an 
alternative methodology that estimates how many households are receiving remittances. 
Data on the average number of people per household and the percentage of households 
receiving remittance transfers are available from the Armenian household survey 
conducted annually (discussed at length in section 4.10.) The survey suggests that in 
2002, 18% of all Armenian households received some remittance income. Combining 
these data on number of recipient households with our estimate of a $200 monthly 
transfer gives an aggregate emigrant remittance value of $324m, which is significantly 
more than the official estimate of $183m:17 
                                                 
14 Temporary workers are not subject to restrictions or questions on bringing into Armenia amounts of cash 
of $10000 or less. 
15 We intended to survey Armenian diasporans living in Los Angeles but were not able to get a US visa for 
our non-US-citizen surveyor. A handful of discussions were conducted by telephone with LA diasporans. 
16 Ratha as cited in Maimbo and Sander (2003), p.16 for Latin American countries; the graph on p. 8 of 
Lapointe (2004) for four Caribbean countries. Estimates of average remittance values are often based on 
data of the National Money Transmitters Association, which provides data on average transfer value from 
the US to other countries. (These data are not publicly available, and we did not have access to them.) 
17 Those familiar with the Armenian household survey argue that households often do not report receiving 
remittance income, and when they do, they underreport the amount received. We do not correct the 
survey’s percentage receiving remittances, but we do deal with the underreporting of amount received by 
using our informal survey’s $200/month value, which is 7 times larger than the average monthly amount 
reported in the household survey. The resulting figure of $324m is in all likelihood an underestimate of the 
actual amount and is thus conservative. 
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Table 2.9 
Official Armenian population 3,000,000 
Average number of people per household 4 
Number of Armenian households 750,000 
% of households receiving remittance transfers 18% 
Number of households receiving remittance transfers 135,000 
Monthly value of remittance transfers to a household $200 
Aggregate value of emigrant remittance transfers $324m 
 
Official and our alternative estimates of remittance flows are summarized in table 2.10. It 
is quite plausible that actual remittance flows into Armenia in 2003 were almost 1 billion 
dollars, and roughly three times as large as officially estimated flows. The most important 
reason for this large difference is our inclusion of money brought home by non-emigrants 
at the end of their working abroad. Measures of remittances cited in the literature usually 
do not include non-emigrant remittances, and if they do, official BOP estimates of non-
emigrant remittances might fail to capture money brought home due to lack of following 
BOP methodologies properly (as was shown in the Armenian case.) 
 
Table 2.10 
Non-emigrant remittances: official (2003) $106m 
Non-emigrant remittances: alternative $494-717m 
Emigrant remittances: official (2003) $183m 
Emigrant remittances: alternative $324m 
Total remittances: official $289m 
Total remittances: alternative $818-1,041m 
 
2.7  Remittances in a Macroeconomic Context : An Overivew 
 
Table 2.11 summarizes official Armenian macroeconomic and balance of payments data 
for the period 1998-2003. After a period of economic collapse and hyperinflation in the 
early 1990s, the economy was stabilized by 1995 and grew at a average rate of 6% during 
1996-2000.  During this period, Armenia was characterized by an extraordinary level of 
external imbalance, with trade deficits of over 25% of GDP and current account deficits 
of over 15% of GDP. Starting in 2001, a boom began in which real growth has been over 
10% per year. Many have attributed this boom to inflows of support from the Lincey 
foundation to reconstruct roads and other public infrastructure and the celebration of 
1700 years of Christianity in 2001. However, the boom is also characterized by a 
dramatic rise in exports, which have grown by 26% on average during 2000-2003. The 
export boom has been fairly broad, with most significant export branches experiencing 
rapid growth.18 Primarily as a result of the export boom, external imbalance has fallen 
sharply: as a percentage of GDP, the trade deficit is now half of what it was in 1998, and 
the current account deficit is one-third of its 1998 value. Investment has also boomed, 
                                                 
18 The export boom is not attributable primarily to the precious stone (diamond) sector, although that sector 
has certainly played a significant role. 
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growing at 21% annually. Private consumption growth has been less but still impressive 
at 8% per year. This positive macroeconomic performance has already fundamentally 
altered Armenia’s economic situation. Dramatic growth in exports and investment with 
steady improvement in private consumption and external imbalance constitute the 
performance of a country that is successfully developing. If this performance can be 
sustained over the longer run, then Armenia could appropriately be called the “Caucus 
Tiger.” Iradian (2003) argues that growth in early transition came mostly from efficiency 
improvement and resource reallocation, but sustaining growth in coming years will 
require increased investment. 
 
A key question is whether rapid growth is being accompanied by falling rates of poverty 
and rising levels of average household income, as happened in the “East Asian miracle.” 
As the Armenian economic boom is only three years old, it is still too early to tell 
whether such a “virtuous cycle” is taking place. Available evidence does suggest that 
poverty and inequality indicators are decreasing, partly because of improvement in social 
benefits targeting in 1999, but also partly due to growth in 2001-02.19 Fiscal performance 
has not been particularly encouraging in terms of progress in establishing a social safety 
net. After reaching peaks in 1999, tax revenues and spending on transfer programs (and 
in particular the family allowance program) have fallen as a percentage of GDP.20 The 
government’s apparent policy is to encourage growth through maintaining 
macroeconomic stability, restraining revenue collection, and not distorting labor market 
incentives. This policy does seem to be having some positive impacts on poverty and 
inequality. Whether increasing tax revenues would negatively impact growth, and how 
increased revenues should be allocated between budget priorities such as health, 
education, and the safety net, are questions that are likely to be of increasing interest. 
 
Remittances have been important for Armenia during transition. Using their official 
measure, in the late 1990s, they were almost 8% of GDP, 40% of exports of goods and 
services, and 30% of the trade deficit. They were thus a key financing component of 
external imbalance that enabled Armenia to run large deficits with the outside world and 
maintain living standards and investment. During the boom of the last three years, 
remittances have grown strongly, at 23% a year on average, and are now over 10% of 
GDP. Their role in helping the economy achieve external balance has also grown. 
Remittances continue to be an important source of external deficit financing, and major 
positive or negative shocks to remittance flows may have important consequences for the 
Armenian macroeconomy. It is still early to try to evaluate remittances’ contribution to 
longer-run economic growth. Iradian (2003) argues that remittances have played a 
significant role in growth during the transition period, but this is not based on any formal 
analysis. 
                                                 
19 See “Social Snapshot and Poverty in Armenia: Statistical Analytical Report 2003,”National Statistical 
Service of the Republic of Armenia, pp.134-135, for data on poverty and inequality measures during 1996-
2002. 
20 The 1999 reform that improved targeting of social benefits did apparently increase support for the 
poorest Armenian families.  
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Table 2.11 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Macroeconomic Performance (growth rate) 
Real GDP 7.3% 3.3% 5.9% 9.6% 12.9% 13.9% 
  Household consumption 5.3% 1.4% 8.3% 6.4% 9.1% 8.4% 
  Public consumption -2.2% 1.3% 2.8% 0.0% 3.2% 14.0% 
  Gross investment 5.2% -4.4% 5.2% 12.6% 18.3% 32.8% 
  Exports of goods and servicesA  6.7% 16.6% 20.8% 29.3% 26.6% 
      Agricultural products  10.3% 66.9% 78.2% 24.7% na 
      Base metals and articles thereof  -30.7% 69.2% 2.5% 2.0% na 
      Machinery, transports and apparatus  -50.4% 64.1% 38.2% 31.9% na 
      Minerals and chemicals  12.3% 17.9% 12.0% -4.2% na 
      Other productsB  107.1% -70.0% 59.7% 40.1% na 
      Precious stones and metals  96.5% 26.3% 1.0% 103.1% na 
      Textiles, leather and footware  9.3% -2.3% 72.9% 19.3% na 
 (% of GDP) 
Total public revenuesC 20.1% 21.8% 19.7% 19.2% 18.9% 18.0% 
  -tax revenues 17.4% 19.9% 18.5% 17.7% 17.9% 17.2% 
Total expenditures 26.4% 30.8% 26.7% 24.5% 22.7% 22.2% 
  -Transfer expenditures 6.4% 8.1% 7.2% 6.5% 5.8% 5.0% 
    of which: family allowances 1.5% 2.2% 1.9% 1.4% 0.9% 0.8% 
Armenian Balance of Payments (million USD) 
Trade deficit -640.8 -536.0 -519.3 -438.0 -409.4 -498.8 
  Exports 359.2 383.1 446.8 539.6 697.6 883.5 
  Imports -1000.0 -919.1 -966.1 -977.6 -1107.0 -1382.3 
Balance on Income 60.4 55.0 52.9 63.6 88.1 91.0 
Balance on Current Transfers 177.4 174.1 188.0 174.0 173.4 224.9 
  Transfers to Armenian government   118.7 97.6 104.5 75.8 56.6 68.4 
Current Account Balance -403.0 -306.9 -278.4 -200.4 -147.9 -182.9 
 (% of GDP) 
Trade Deficit -33.9% -29.0% -27.2% -20.7% -17.3% -17.8% 
Current Account Balance -21.3% -16.6% -14.6% -9.5% -6.2% -6.5% 
Remittances (official) 
Value in million USD 133.1 161.0 154.6 181.7 223.8 289.2 
    -growth  21% -4% 18% 23% 29% 
Value in million dram (1998 prices)D 67.2 86.1 84.6 98.0 121.5 150.5 
    -growth  28% -2% 16% 24% 24% 
  % of GDP 7.0% 8.7% 8.1% 8.6% 9.4% 10.3% 
  % of exports 37.1% 42.0% 34.6% 33.7% 32.1% 32.7% 
  % of trade deficit 20.8% 30.0% 29.8% 41.5% 54.7% 58.0% 
Source: official statistics of the National Statistics Service of the Republic Armenia. 
A : Growth in exports and its branches calculated using value in USD. 
B : wood, paper, furniture, works of art. 
C : Excluding grants. 
D : USD values converted into nominal dram values using commercial exchange rate, then 
converted into real dram values with GDP deflator index. 
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2.8  Comparing Macroeconomic Apples and Oranges 
 
Our review of macroeconomic performance and the importance of remittances is based 
on comparisons of official macroeconomic data. It is tempting to use our alternative 
estimate of remittance flows to evaluate the true importance of remittances to the 
economy. However, making a ratio of this estimate to GDP might give a misleading 
picture of remittance importance, because it might be comparing macroeconomic “apples 
and oranges.” In order for the ratio to be accurate, GDP must be fully adjusted to capture 
the shadow economy. More generally, in comparing macroeconomic variables, it is 
important that the variables capture their shadow sectors to roughly the same degree. 
Official data have the merit of being internally consistent. To compare an alternative 
estimate that fully captures its relevant shadow sector to an official estimate that only 
partially captures its shadow sector may produce a much more inaccurate picture than if 
one compared official estimates. 
 
Table 2.12 illustrates this point with three hypothetical scenarios. In scenario A, the share 
of the shadow sector for both remittances and GDP is 50%. The ratio of official 
remittances to official GDP is equal to the ratio of actual remittances to actual GDP. This 
illustrates an important general point: if the relative sizes of unmeasured shadow sectors 
are identical across macroeconomic aggregates, then ratios of official values are identical 
to ratios of actual values, and it is not necessary to adjust for the shadow sectors in order 
to measure the relative importance or weight of various aggregates. If, however, the 
relative sizes of the shadow sectors differ, then adjustment will make a difference to the 
ratio. Scenarios B and C show that if the remittance shadow sector is relatively larger or 
smaller than the GDP shadow sector, the ratio of official measures understates or 
overstates the importance of remittances in the economy respectively. 
 
Table 2.12 
  Official 
value 
Official 
+ 
shadow 
Share of 
shadow 
sector: 
Off rem./ 
Off GDP 
Total rem./ 
Total GDP 
Total rem./ 
Off. GDP 
Off. Rem./ 
Total GDP 
A Remittances 5 10 50% 10% 10% 20% 5% 
 GDP 50 100 50%     
B Remittances 5 10 50% 10% 13% 20% 7% 
 GDP 50 75 33%     
C Remittances 5 10 50% 10% 8% 20% 4% 
 GDP 50 125 60%     
 
This point is relevant to the remittances literature, as the indicator most often used to 
assess the importance of remittances in an economy is the ratio of remittances to GDP. 
For example, it is often noted than in many sub-Saharan African countries, remittances 
are poorly measured and often have very large shadow sectors. However, GDP will also 
typically be under-measured and have a large shadow sector. The ratio of the official 
values of remittances and GDP will understate the actual importance of remittances if the 
shadow sector for remittances is relatively larger than the shadow sector for GDP. 
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In the case of Armenia, it is known that the NSS attempts to include the shadow economy 
in its estimate of GDP. The NSS adjusts GDP estimates for unreported activity by using 
the “Italian method.” Firms’ reported employment and output are used to calculate labor 
productivity by sector of the economy. Results of a labor survey that is done once a year 
are used to estimate levels of employment by sector; the labor survey is believed to much 
more accurately capture true employment than employment reported by firms. The 
shadow economy is then estimated in monetary terms by sector by multiplying estimated 
labor productivity by unreported employment (difference between survey and firms’ 
reported numbers.) Using this method, the NSS estimates that roughly 30-35% of total 
GDP is in the shadow economy. It is hard to say if this is realistic or not. Many of those 
familiar with the Armenian economy feel that this share is too low, but some indicated 
that they believe it to be plausible. 
 
Table 2.13 below summarizes our findings on Armenian remittances and GDP. The most 
common measure of the importance of remittances to the economy that is used in the 
remittance literature is the ratio of official “workers’ remittances” to GDP, which was 
0.3% for Armenia in 2003. This is an absurdly low number, and yet it corresponds to 
what one often sees in the literature.21 We have shown that one needs to be very careful 
in constructing a measure of remittance inflow into a country even using only official 
data. In the Armenian case, “other – diaspora” inflows must be added to “workers’ 
remittances” under any plausible definition of remittances; the ratio of official 
remittances to GDP rises to 6.5%. We also argue that non-emigrant remittances should be 
included as well, and that gives a total of 10.3%.  
 
The big difference between the official data and our alternative estimates clearly lies in 
our estimate of money that non-emigrants (temporary workers) are bringing back to 
Armenia with them upon completion of their job ($448.5m) Alternative values for 
emigrant remittances and non-emigrant flow remittances are not hugely different from 
the official values. The ratio of our alternative estimates of these two flows to official 
total GDP is roughly 17%, which is higher than 10.3%. However, including non-emigrant 
savings, which are estimated at 16% of official GDP, produces a dramatic increase in the 
importance of remittances to the economy. We also compare all remittance flows to a 
value of GDP that has a 50% shadow sector, as opposed to the 32.5% shadow sector that 
NSS includes in its official estimate. Even with a larger shadow sector in GDP, 
remittance flows clearly remain highly significant for Armenia. 
 
We believe that the most plausible scenario in table 2.13 is our alternative estimate 
compared to GDP with a 50% shadow sector. In this scenario, if attention is restricted 
only to remittance flows that are strictly transfer payments, then the ratio of remittances 
to GDP is 12.8%. If nonemigrant savings are also included, then the ratio is 24.6%. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 See, for example, the IMF working paper by Chami et al (2003.) Their appendix table 2 has remittances 
averaging 0.5% of GDP during 1995-8. 
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Table 2.13 
Emigrant remittances Nonemigrant remittances Total 
remittances 
Million USD 
“Workers’ 
remittances” 
Other – 
diaspora 
Total Flow Savings Total  
Official 9.3 173.7 183.0 106.2 - 106.2 289.2 
Alternative na na 324.0 157.0B 448.5B 605.5 929.5 
Ratio of alternative to 
official 
- - 177% 148% - 570% 321% 
Ratio of official remittance flow to: 
  Nonshadow GDP 0.5% 9.2% 9.7% 5.6% - 5.6% 15.3% 
  NSS total GDP 0.3% 6.2% 6.5% 3.8% - 3.8% 10.3% 
  50% shad.econ. GDP 0.2% 4.6% 4.8% 2.8% - 2.8% 7.7% 
Ratio of alternative remittance flow to: 
  NSS GDP - - 11.6% 5.6% 16.0% 21.6% 33.2% 
  50% shad.econ. GDP - - 8.6% 4.2% 11.9% 16.0% 24.6% 
A : NSS total GDP is the official estimate of GDP in 2003 ($2797m) that includes a shadow 
economy that is 32.5% of total GDP. Nonshadow GDP ($1888m) excludes the NSS shadow 
sector. 50% shad.econ. GDP ($3776m) increases the shadow sector to 50% of total GDP. 
B : average of range identified in section 2.5 
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3.  ARMENIAN REMITTANCE TRANSFER CHANNELS AND THEIR COSTS 
 
3.1  Remittance Transfer Channels 
 
Formal and informal remittance transfer channels that we have identified being used in 
Armenia are:22 
 
Table 3.1 
Formal Channels Informal Channels 
Bank transfer services Carried by oneself 
Dedicated money transfer operators (MTOs): 
Western Union, MoneyGram 
Carried by friends, relatives 
Courier services  
Hawala-type services (see sec.3.4) 
 
Diasporan individuals interviewed in our informal survey were asked about what 
channel(s) they send remittances to Armenia through; results are given in table 3.2 below. 
Remarkably, diasporans in Russia are making much higher use of formal channels than 
diasporans in western Europe, particularly of banks. This is because banks that have 
focused on providing remittance transfer service at low cost have entered the CIS 
financial market (Anelik and Unibank; these transfer systems do not operate in non-CIS 
countries.) The transfer market mechanism is evidently working competitively, at least 
for transfers from the CIS. A greater reliance on informal channels in western Europe 
may reflect the fact that for western banks, money transfer is an ancillary service 
provided for the convenience of customers rather than a business focus.23 
 
Table 3.2 
of which: of which:  Number 
of 
interviews 
Size of 
average 
monthly 
transfer 
Through 
formal 
channels 
Banks Credit 
card 
MTOs 
Through 
informal 
channels 
Courier By oneself, 
through 
friend or 
relative 
London 32 $204 20* 
(57%) 
8 0 12 15* 
(43%) 
0 15 
Bruxelles 16 $161 10* 
(59%) 
3 0 7 7* 
(41%) 
3 4 
Paris 29 $131 13 
(45%) 
7 0 6 16 
(55%) 
0 16 
Moscow 53 $217 47 
(89%) 
40 5 2 6 
(11%) 
0 6 
Rostov 36 $279 33 
(92%) 
33 0 0 3 
(8%) 
0 3 
Source: informal survey of diasporan individuals carried out for this study. 
                                                 
22 For a review of formal and informal remittance transfer channels operating in other regions, see IOM 
(2003) (Guatemale) and Sander and Maimbo (2003) (Africa), among others. 
23 Ordering an international wire transfer from a large western bank can be difficult and unreliable, 
particularly if a second transfer through an intermediary bank is required. 
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* : Sum of formal and informal channel users sums to more than the number of interviews due to 
the fact that some interviewers use more than one channel. 
 
The Armenian banking system comprises nineteen banks, and most of these banks 
provide money transfer services.24 MTOs also operate in Armenia, primarily Western 
Union and MoneyGram. Most banks use one of four systems to effect transfers: Western 
Union, MoneyGram, Anelik, and Unistream. The value of all transfer inflows into 
Armenia, including remittances, commercial, and public-sector transfers, is: 
 
Table 3.3 
Transfers received : AMD million 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Anelik    42632 72484 70220 
Unistream     17118 44394 
Western Union  16525 28388 27581 33485 37722 
Money Gram  50 18118 3741 4941 5660 
Other transfer systems     4574 17022 
  Total 16575 46506 73954 132602 175018 
Memo: 
Anelik and Unistream as % of total   58% 68% 65% 
Source:  ARKA News Agency and Central Bank of Armenia. 
 
Table 3.3 reveals that Anelik and Unistream have become the dominant transfer systems 
used in Armenia today. The nominal value of transfers has risen dramatically since 1999. 
 
3.2  Formal-Sector Remittance Transfer Costs 
 
Fees for transfer service vary widely and usually involve a minimum fee. Below we have 
listed bank minimum fees and percentage fees for non-customers that are charged on 
making an inward transfer of U.S. dollars, MTO charges, and the percentage cost on a 
$200 transfer (the value that we estimate as the average monthly transfer value from 
western Europe and Russia) and a $50 transfer: 
                                                 
24 This does not include the Armenian Communications Bank, which was placed under government control 
and supervision in 2003. 
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Table 3.4 
Total percentage cost of a 
transfer by non-customers 
for a remittance value of: 
Bank Minimum fee Percentage charged 
to non-customers 
$200  $50 
ACBA $50 if not by Anelik 
system 
3% via Anelik system, 
1% otherwise 
3.0%* 3.0%* 
Anelik None 1.5% if between 
branches of Anelik and 
AnelikRU; otherwise 
charges can run up to 
4% 
1.5% 1.5% 
Ardshininvest $10 0.2% 5.2% 20.2% 
Areximbank  2% 2.0% 2.0% 
Arimpexbank $5 0.5% 3.0% 10.5% 
Armeconombank AMD 3000 up to 
$500, then AMD 
5000 
 2.9% 11.7% 
Arminvestbank $4 0.5% 2.5% 8.5% 
Armsavingsbank $15 0.2% 7.7% 30.2% 
Converse Bank $15  7.5% 30.0% 
Emporiki Bank $15 0.2% 7.7% 30.2% 
HSBC AMD 18000 1% 18.5% 70.9% 
Inecobank $15 0.2%, also has just 
started 1-1.5% without 
minimum 
1.5% 1.5% 
Melllat Bank $15 0.25% 7.8% 30.3% 
Unibank None 1% from Russia, 
elsewhere higher 
1.0% 1.0% 
Western Union Commission schedule 
depending on value of 
remittance 
None 11.0% 26.0% 
* : Cost of going through Anelik system. 
Source:  Interviews with bank officials and from “Banking Services,”ARKA News Agency, 
#7(59), July 6, 2004. 
 
The most important insight that comes from table 3.4 is that Anelik and Unibank, the two 
most heavily used formal-sector channels, have a very low percentage cost on a $200 
transfer (1.5% and 1.0% respectively.) These two banks have made money transfer a 
business focus, and these fees are low by international standards. The situation suggests 
that pricing of money transfers in Armenia is quite competitive (there is the possibility 
that banks are earning “above-normal” profits on money transfers, but it is not likely.) 
The banks’ business strategies may be to price transfers highly competitively and make 
higher rates of profit on non-transfer services, whose volume is enhanced by having 
many transfers come through the bank. 
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An important point regarding minimum fees on transfers is that they push small-value 
transfers into the informal sector, because a small minimum fee can be a large fee in 
percentage terms if the value of the remittance is small. This is illustrated by the fees in 
percentage terms on a $50 transfer in table 3.4 above. However, because Anelik and 
Unibank do not charge minimum fees, their percentage fees remain very low. These two 
banks now account for most of the money transfers coming into Armenia, and their 
pricing policies have brought some transfers that used to go through informal channels 
into the formal sector. Their pricing policies also explain why our informal survey found 
a much heavier use of formal channels in Russia than western Europe. It is also true that 
transfers made through Anelik and Unibank are processed very quickly and efficiently.25 
 
3.3  Remittance Flows and the Armenian Banking Sector 
 
When advocating reform of the remittance transfer system and introduction of greater 
competition leading to lower fees, one must consider the impact of such changes on the 
banking system.26 If the system is heavily dependent on transfer fee income, then such 
changes could, if they reduce fee income enough, imperil the banking system. 
Information on Armenian bank profits in 2003 and the first half of 2004 are reported in 
table 3.5 below.  We are most interested in the revenues received from commissions, 
which includes fees received on transfers.27 Income from fees for the first three quarters 
in 2003 is shown in table 3.6.  Banks earned 17.9% of their income from fees in this 
period, about two-thirds of all commission revenues.  For 2003 as a whole, 27.5% of 
bank revenues derived from commissions, which include all fees on transfers (including 
remittances) and some other elements.28 
 
                                                 
25 Our interviewer watched transfers being made in Anelik and Unibank branches in Moscow and Rostov 
and remarked on the efficiency of the process. One NGO head told us that 15-20 minutes is required for an 
electronic transfer to be effected through the Anelik and Unistream systems. 
26 A detailed and informative survey of the Armenian banking sector is Armenia Microenterprise 
Development Initiative, “Assessment of the Opportunities for Banks to Enter the MSE Market,” December 
2003. Grigorian (2003) analyzes why the level of financial intermediation is so low in Armenia and 
measures that could be taken to raise it. 
27 Our impression is that these are the major part, but we were not able to get the commission figure broken 
down further after the third quarter of 2003 due to a change in reporting.   
28 Note that those banks with the highest share of commissions in revenue are also those banks most heavily 
involved in the formal remittance business. 
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Table 3.5 
 Income 
Net 
interest 
income 
Net 
commissions
Net 
currency 
txns 
Investment 
income 
(net) 
All 
others Expenses 
Profits 
before 
tax Tax 
Net 
profit 
TOTAL 25132 13870 7051 2043 317 1851 16515 8296 1691 6605 
HSBC 3852 1977 982 810 5 78 1810 2042 221 1821 
Armeconombank 2632 1690 604 159 28 151 1565 1067 252 815 
Inecobank 1541 1020 245 66 1 209 550 991 215 776 
Ardshininvest 2139 1085 505 193 -11 367 1225 914 213 701 
Anelik 3785 754 2655 254 58 64 2875 910 273 637 
Converse 2491 1432 621 -29 199 268 1877 614 126 488 
ACBA 2149 1853 183 66 26 21 1481 668 201 467 
Artsakhbank 855 704 84 57 0 10 479 376 0 376 
Armimpex 957 634 174 102 4 43 525 432 105 327 
Armsavings 2505 1202 1015 205 0 83 2302 203 0 203 
Prometey 413 287 27 67 0 32 210 203 0 203 
Unibank 444 461 -73 54 2 0 393 51 9 42 
Emporiki Bank 382 305 21 48 3 5 340 42 0 42 
ITB 414 396 12 -3 2 7 364 50 8 42 
International Inv Bank 573 70 -4 -6 0 513 519 54 14 40 
Arminvestbank 842 653 74 7 4 104 828 14 11 3 
Mellat Bank 366 186 110 33 0 37 366 0 1 -1 
Areximbank 663 235 368 54 0 6 812 -149 0 -149 
Arm Dev Bank 649 457 68 65 40 19 910 -261 0 -261 
Source:  ARKA News Agency. All figures in thousands of Armenian drams. 
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Table 3.6 
Bank Fee income 
(1000 AMD) 
As share of 
noninterest 
income 
As share of total 
income 
“Anelik Bank” 1 999 159 91.9% 48.5% 
Areximbank 303 546 89.8% 24.1% 
Armsavingsbank 737 473 77.7% 22.5% 
Converse Bank 665 624 74.5% 20.3% 
“Mellat Bank” 75 008 64.1% 18.7% 
“HSBC Bank Armenia” 664 856 52.3% 18.5% 
Armeconombank 506 348 71.0% 17.6% 
Unibank 167 228 85.4% 15.9% 
Armagrobank 388 484 58.4% 14.6% 
Armimpexbank 152 695 60.4% 11.5% 
Inecobank 182 513 45.3% 11.1% 
Agricultural Cooperative Bank 193 430 158.1% 8.5% 
“Prometey Bank” 49 262 58.4% 8.4% 
Armenian Development Bank 102 564 58.9% 6.8% 
Arminvestbank 67 086 39.3% 6.7% 
Com. Bank of Greece (Armenia) 21 381 38.7% 5.3% 
Artsakhbank 67 701 68.8% 5.2% 
International Investment Bank 11 652 8.2% 4.6% 
ITB International Trade Bank 11 521 98.5% 3.4% 
Ardshininvestbank 27 990 5.8% 1.1% 
Source:  ARKA News Agency. 
 
For the 2 banks that specialize in transfers from Russia, Anelik and Unibank, their fees 
are a major part of their revenue stream (particularly Anelik.)  Areximbank, 
Armsavingsbank, and Conversebank also make a good amount of their revenues from 
fees. Armsavingsbank and Armeconombank have extensive branches throughout the 
country; for transfers they use the Anelik system and add a surcharge as the destination 
bank for the transfer. Each bank reports the volume of international transfers into and out 
of Armenia through a report monthly to the Central Bank of Armenia.  The methods by 
which transfers occur include Western Union (9 banks), Money Gram (2 banks), Anelik 
(5 banks), Unistream (2 banks), Interexpress (1 bank), Express (2 banks), and Contact (1 
bank).29  As discussed in section 2, these figures are combined to help calculate the 
balance of payments for the country by providing some of the measurement of 
remittances and private transfers.  
 
Armenia has one dominant system for transfers from Russia, Anelik, with whom Unibank 
has entered into competition charging the same price.  Both banks rely on an existing 
extensive branching network in Russia (particularly in areas where migrant Armenian 
workers congregate) to overcome fixed costs involved in transferring funds.  Anelik has 
interest expenses equivalent to those at similar-situated banks; Unibank as the newer 
                                                 
29 “Armenian Banking System Money Transfer Volume Makes AMD 61.9 Bln by the System of 
International Payments for 2Q of 2004.”  ARKA News Agency, Business and Privatization #62 (823) 
August 5, 2004, p. 11. 
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entry is currently paying about 80 basis points more in interest expenses (as a share of 
deposits).  Larger banks like Converse or HSBC conceivably could compete.  However, 
they behave more as banks for commercial enterprises; many banks we interviewed 
equated the money transfer issue with helping import/export business and were mute 
about household transfers.  (The notable exceptions were those firms handling household 
transfers as a sideline business, often for ownership families and their friends.)  It seems 
to us unlikely that larger banks will compete in household transfers in the near future. 
  
Anelik and Unibank, on the other hand, are building deposit bases from their activities.  
Both hold a greater share of their assets in customer lending than the average bank in 
Armenia (Anelik at 68.9%, Unibank at 54.3% versus an average of 43% for the 
industry).  Banking is in large part an information industry, with bankers acquiring 
private information about their customers’ finances.  Handling household money 
transfers can provide a bank with information about a customer’s credit history.  As such, 
it may lead to those banks lending more to their customers.  If true, banks that seek to 
serve the household and small business sectors in Armenia will engage in the money 
transfer market, and since the information has value to the bank the fees charged for 
transfers will also fall.  Banks who do not need that information or who do not serve 
those markets may see no reason to reduce the fees charged for money transfers. 
 
3.4  Informal-Sector Remittance Flows 
 
Informal channels come in several forms.  Remittances are brought to families by the 
remitter, either during visits (emigrants) or upon return from temporary work abroad 
(non-emigrants.) Other family members or friends can bring them back.  This is 
particularly more likely when dealing with gifts sent by diasporan families. Economies of 
scale can be realized through one person bringing back remittances for several families. 30 
Tours by churches and diasporan social groups are quite common, particularly from the 
United States.31 
 
Individuals wishing to send money may also use couriers, and this money may move 
informally.  These are usually some variations of the informal fund transfer (IFT) systems 
such as hawala that are common for remittances to Islamic countries. Such informal 
systems were first developed for trade finance “because of the dangers of traveling with 
gold and other forms of payment on routes beset with bandits”:32 
 
                                                 
30 According to several people we spoke with in the Los Angeles diasporan community, one tourist to 
Armenia will typically carry two or three other money transfers along with their own. When they arrive at 
their hotel in Armenia, they will call a phone number and say they have brought the money, and the 
receiving family will usually come to the hotel to pick up the money. 
31 Tours organized in this way are more likely, through their social networks, to have brought informal 
transfers not only for the family and friends of the tourists but also for those of the other members of the 
church or social group. 
32 “Hawala: How does this informal funds transfer system work, and should it be regulated?” Finance and 
Development 39, December 2002.  On line at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/12/elqorchi.htm. 
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“The system is swifter than formal financial transfer systems partly because of the 
lack of bureaucracy and the simplicity of its operating mechanism; instructions 
are given to correspondents by phone, facsimile, or e-mail; and funds are often 
delivered door to door within 24 hours by a correspondent who has quick access 
to villages even in remote areas. The minimal documentation and accounting 
requirements, the simple management, and the lack of bureaucratic procedures 
help reduce the time needed for transfer operations.” 
 
Money usually does not move between countries in these systems. Anecdotal evidence 
confirms the use of hawala-type mechanisms in moving remittances to Armenia, in 
particular from the United States. A variant of this approach that was described to us by 
an Armenian banker concerned a group that gathered funds in a remitting country, 
bundled them, and sent the aggregate sum to a firm in Armenia, thus lowering 
transactions costs because the firm could use SWIFT at a transfer cost of 0.4%. The 
money is picked up by the firm and “unbundled” for delivery to the intended recipients.  
Another banker said he used such a firm to send $150 as an experiment, and his cost was 
$4. 
 
These IFTs typically earn both fee revenue and revenue resulting from differences in 
exchange rates between official and curb markets.33 The presence of parallel exchange 
rate systems tends to encourage the formation and proliferation of IFTs, as well as 
repressive financial policies, inefficient banking institutions, and unstable political 
situations. Our informal survey of the channels used by diasporan Armenians suggests for 
diasporans in the CIS, couriers and other IFTs are not used much (table 3.2.) This is not 
surprising, as Armenia has a unified exchange rate system, and there has been dynamic 
positive developments in remittance transfer systems in the CIS (the emergence of the 
Anelik and Unistream systems.) Our informal survey and anecdotal evidence suggests 
that IFTs are used on a more frequent basis by diasporans in Europe and the US. 
  
When informal channels are used, it might be optimal from an individual viewpoint, but 
it nonetheless imposes costs on society as a whole: 
 
• Funds sent through informal channels never enter the banking system and thus 
reduce the probability that they will be made available for intermediation. A 
remitted dollar that is left in the banking system would generate approximately 
$2.10 of additional lending in the banking system through multiple deposit 
expansion.34 The major reasons for why funds are not kept in the banking system 
are perceived financial and taxation policies and lack of confidence and trust in 
the banks, not usage of informal transfer channels. Nonetheless, increasing use of 
the formal sector to channel funds will increase the level of intermediation on the 
margin; 
                                                 
33 El-Qorchi, op cit.  See also Roger Ballard, “A Background Report on the Operation of Informal Value 
Transfer Systems (Hawala).” Mimeo, Centre for Applied Southern Asian Studies, University of 
Manchester, April 2003.  On line at http://www.art.man.ac.uk/CASAS/pdfpapers/hawala.pdf.    
34 This is approximately the value of the M2 money multiplier as of end-2003. 
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• An issue with IFT systems that has become of great concern in recent years is 
money laundering.  Many channels of the informal sector discussed above are 
largely not an issue in this regard for Armenia, however.  Most remittances are 
household-to-household transfers and often move in cash physically over borders, 
and there can be no question of laundering in these cases.  Use of hawala-type 
IFTs could cause some concern, but we did not see many instances where families 
were using this type of transaction. Money laundering through the formal 
financial sector is of more serious concern in Armenia today; 
• Use of informal channels inhibits the ability of the Central Bank to measure the 
presence of foreign exchange in the system. This complicates the conduct of 
monetary and stabilization policies. Remittance influxes are not likely to be 
steady, either seasonally or annually, and not having accurate data on their flows 
makes exchange rate-based management of monetary policy more difficult. 
 
A key theme that pervades discussion of the Armenian financial system is the question of 
trust – in the formal financial system, in IFT systems, in families, and in government. Our 
informal survey participants constantly stressed that they did business with individuals 
they trusted. Armenian and western experts told us on several occasions that the reason 
that people do not transfer money through the formal sector has little to do with cost and 
everything to do with trust. Small-value transferors avoid banks because they fear that the 
bank will be insolvent or illiquid, the two segments of banks that exist (one serving a 
small elite, and another consisting of “pocket” banks serving their owners’ circle) do not 
serve the broad public, and banks generally do not have enough incentives to make 
transfers work right (a problem everywhere.) There is evidence that trust in the formal 
financial system, at least with respect to remittance transfer, is increasing: transfer 
volumes through the Anelik and Unistream systems have grown dramatically, and these 
two banks do appear to be oriented to serving the broad public and focused on making 
transfers work right. 
 
The fear of improper information disclosure is another issue. There is a strong desire 
among Armenian transferors for privacy, to avoid both taxes and the prying eyes of 
neighbors. The formal rights of public-sector agents to collect information on transfers is 
as follows: 
• The Central Bank has the right to collect any information mandated by their 
supervisory role, and they evidently collect information on transfers down to at 
least $400 in value; 
• The police have the right to access banking information only when a criminal or 
civil case has been initiated and there is a court order; 
• Tax authorities have the right to access banking information only when a criminal 
or civil case has been initiated. 
There is concern, however, that on an informal basis, information is sometimes passed 
between bank employees and government agencies. 
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3.5  Access to the Formal Financial Sector 
 
What percentage of people in Armenia have access to the formal financial sector? No 
survey data is available to answer this question, although it would be straightforward to 
add two or three questions to the Armenian household survey (see section 4) to find out. 
The only relevant data that is available is on the number of branches for particular banks: 
 
Table 3.7 
Bank Number of Branches 
Agricultural Cooperative Bank 8 
Anelik Bank 6 
Ardshinvest 26 
Arexim Bank 3 
ArmAgro Bank 35 
ArmEconom Bank 24 
Arminpex Bank  
ArmInvest Bank  
ArmSavings Bank 101 
Artsakh Bank 11 
Commercial Bank of Greece  
Converse Bank 7 
Development Bank  
HSBC 1 
Inecobank 2 
International Investment Bank  
ITB  
Mellat Bank  
Prometey Bank 1 
UniBank 5 
Source: Armenia Microenterprise Development Initiative, “Assessment of the Opportunities for 
Banks to Enter the MSE Market,” December 2003, p.9. 
 
One bank (ArmSavings) has a very extensive branch network extending throughout the 
country, and three others (Ardshinvest, ArmAgro, and ArmEconom) also have very 
extensive networks. However, Armenia is a small country in geographical size, and it is 
not clear that a bank needs to have over a few branches in order to be accessible to the 
majority of the population. If some or all of the four banks with extensive branch 
networks use the Anelik or UniBank transfer systems, then coverage with respect to 
transfers with CIS countries might be geographically extensive. It would be useful and 
straightforward to survey Armenian households to test this idea. 
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4. THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF REMITTANCES 
 
4.1  Economic Impacts of Remittances: Overview 
 
Consensus views on the impact of migration and remittances on the sending countries 
have been subject to cycles of pessimism and optimism. In the early 1990s, for example, 
the general pessimistic view was that remittances do not promote growth but “exacerbate 
the dependency of sending communities by raising material expectations without 
providing a means of satisfying them, other than more migration. Individual families 
attain higher standards of living, but communities achieve little autonomous growth.”35 
Some analysts went so far as to advise governments and donors to discourage migration 
and remittances.36 There has been a sea-change in recent years in the consensus view, and 
currently there is a great deal of excitement about the potential of remittance inflows to 
support growth and development. This is due partly to the fact that remittance flows to 
developing and transition countries have become so large, and partly because the 
theoretical understanding of remittances has changed (see below.) Although the 
consensus view on remittances has become quite positive, the questions that led to 
skepticism in earlier years remain open, and there is as yet no decisive answer to whether 
remittances facilitate or hinder growth and development. 
 
Contemporary views on the economic benefits and costs of remittances to a receiving 
country can be summarized as:37 
 
Table 4.1 
Potential Benefits Potential Costs 
Are a stable source of foreign exchange 
that ease FX constraints and help finance 
external deficits 
Ease pressure on governments to 
implement reforms and reduce external 
imbalances (moral hazard) 
Are potential source of savings and 
investment for capital formation and 
development 
Reduce savings of recipient families and 
thus negatively impact growth and 
development (moral hazard) 
Facilitate investment in children’s 
education and human capital formation 
Reduce labor effort of recipient families 
and thus negatively impact growth and 
development (moral hazard) 
Raise the standard of living of recipients 
through increasing consumption 
Migration leads to “brain drain” and 
negative impacts on economy that are not 
fully compensated by remittance transfers 
Reduce income inequality Increase income inequality 
Reduce poverty  
 
As will be discussed further below, in recent years a view has emerged that migration and 
remittances are outcomes of the decisions of families that are behaving optimally given 
the opportunities and constraints that they face. Simplistic views that remittances lead to 
                                                 
35 Durand et al (1996), p.249; Adams (1991), p.695. 
36 Cuthbertson and Cole (1995) as cited in Brown (1997), p.623. 
37 Russell (1986) provides a table summarizing earlier views on remittance costs and benefits. 
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“excessive” consumption, import dependency, or “unproductive” investment in housing 
and land are no longer tenable. The potential costs of remittances are now viewed as 
largely deriving from moral hazard problems. Remittances could ease pressure on 
governments faced with large external deficits to engage in difficult structural reforms. 
They also could negatively impact labor effort and savings and investment of recipient 
households, even if the remittance sender wants the family to work hard or save and 
invest. 
 
4.2  Armenian Remittance Flows and Household Use 
 
The following figure places remittance flows and their use in the context of the complete 
picture of incomes and expenditures of an Armenian household: 
 
Figure 4.2 
INCOMES        EXPENDITURES 
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Even this figure is only partial. It does not show how uses of remittances for investment 
purposes stimulate economic activity that affect the household’s domestic employment 
income, the affects of paying higher taxes, etc. Ideally, analysis of migration and 
remittances would be conducted in the context of the household embedded in a model of 
the entire economy. In practice, this is very difficult. Few studies have been so ambitious 
to attempt a “general equilibrium” analysis, and those that have must make some 
simplifying assumptions so as to maintain mathematical tractability or consistency with 
available empirical data. Studies on remittances usually restrict their attention to a 
particular subset of the household choice problem. 
 
4.3  Emigration and Remittances: Competing Models of Behavior 
 
One of the key questions that is apparent from the above figure is how decisions on 
emigration and remittances are made within a family. In particular, what are the 
motivations and constraints faced by those who emigrate and those who stay, and how do 
these motivations and constraints result in household decisions and economic outcomes? 
A traditional view is that family members migrate because they have better income 
opportunities abroad, and once they begin to earn that income, they share it with their 
family members for altruistic motives. The primary determinant of migration is thus 
wage differentials, and the primary determinant of remittances is altruism. Recent 
research (Chami et al (2003)) has emphasized a potential problem that can arise in 
altruism-based decision-making due to the fact that the emigrant sending remittances 
cannot know for sure to what extent the recipient is trying to earn labor income or is 
properly investing remittances as opposed to spending them on consumption. This “moral 
hazard” problem has the implication that remittances can have a negative impact on 
longer-run growth. 
 
Another approach that has been called the “new theory of migration” assumes that 
families make migration decisions similar to the way that investors develop a portfolio of 
assets.38 Remittances are viewed as a part of a family’s “self-enforcing, cooperative, 
contractual arrangement.”39 Family members are sent abroad to work in order to 
maximize household earnings and reduce its risk of fluctuations. Households thus pool 
individual member incomes and take decisions as a collective unit. By pooling incomes, 
they can smooth individual members’ consumption over good and bad times. Families 
often have good methods of enforcing implicit contracts through altruism, inheritance 
decisions, and maintenance of investments of the emigrant in the home country. 
 
Empirical research has been carried out over the past 30 years on both the decision of a 
migrant worker to remit or not remit, and the size of a remittance if the worker does 
remit. Banerjee (1984) finds that factors that determine the decision to remit differ from 
those determining the size of a remittance, education and income are not important in the 
decision to remit but positively affect the size of a remittance, the presence of a wife in 
the family to which remittances are sent increases the likelihood of remittance, and the 
                                                 
38 See Lucas and Stark (1985) and Stark and Lucas (1988) for rich descriptions of this theory using 
Botswana as an example, and Stark (1991) for a more concise description. 
39 Stark and Lucas (1988), p.465. 
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likelihood of remittances is greater the higher the dependency burden in the rural 
household. Knowles and Anker (1981) find that the decision of emigrant to remit depends 
directly on the likelihood that they will have to return at some point to their home, 
whereas the amount remitted depends on income. Hoddinott (1994) treats the decision to 
emigrate and remit as outcomes resulting from a bargaining agreement between the 
migrant and family (altruism is ruled out) and finds empirical results that generally favor 
the non-altruistic approach. Education and income of migrant are positively associated 
with remittance size. Ilahi and Jafarey (1999) use data on roughly 1000 Pakistani 
migrants to show that remittances made by migrants rose in proportion to the loan 
obligation that they had incurred with their family to finance emigration costs, additional 
evidence in favor of the “new theory of migration.” Brown (1997) uses data on Pacific 
island households to show that migrants make remittances for reasons of self-interest, in 
particular asset accumulation and investment back home, and that remittances do not 
“decay” with the length of time that an emigrant has been abroad. This is direct support 
for the “new theory of migration.” 
 
The empirical evidence generally supports the “new theory of migration.” This is 
encouraging to those who believe that remittances can play an important role in growth 
and development, because it implies that migrants are motivated to make remittances out 
of self-interest and in particular to save and accumulate assets in their home country. 
 
4.4  Use of Remittances: Consumption Versus Investment 
 
Use of remittances is an important question for assessing whether remittances promote 
growth and development. Several studies have empirically assessed the degree to which 
remittances are spent on consumption or investment: 
 
Table 4.3 
 Adams 
(1991) 
(Egypt) 
Glytsos 
(1993) 
(Greece) 
IOM 
(2003) 
(Guatemala) 
Gilani et al (1981) 
(Pakistan) 
Consumption na 62.6% 61.8% 62% 
Nonconsumption na 37.4% 38.2% 38% 
Of which:     
  Housing 56.3% 59.6% 
  Land 20.5% 19.3% 
28.7% 58%C 
  Machinery 7.9%A 10.6% 
  Shops (trade) 3.1% 10.6% 
32.6%B 30%C 
  Marriage 8.9% - - 8% 
  Financial savings - - 38.7% 4% 
Basis of estimate: Adams– 75 rural Egyptian households; Glystos – combination of a variety of 
data described in his appendix A; IOM – 1425 households surveyed; Gilani et al – survey of 
migrant Pakistani households. 
A : Excludes consumer durables, except for automobiles. 
B : Includes purchases of intermediate business inputs, agricultural inputs, and livestock, and 
repayment of business loans. 
C : Percentages spent on real estate and real assets, respectively 
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This evidence suggests that the propensity to save out of remittance income is high 
(almost 40%) and remarkably consistent across studies, and that investment is primarily 
in housing and land, and secondarily in business activity (machinery and shops.)40 
Swamy (1985) summarizes evidence from other studies showing even higher marginal 
propensities to save (pp. 36-7.) There is considerable evidence that migrants often save 
out of their overseas earning for the purpose of coming back into their home country with 
a nest egg for investment either in a business or for a home. Taylor (1992) finds in a 
sample of rural Mexican families that remittances are associated with an increase in 
livestock investment. Sofranko and Idris (1999) find in a sample of 170 small-town 
Pakistani families that 32% used remittance income to finance business investments 
(start-up or expansion of shop or other small business), and 13% of total remittance 
income was spent on this purpose. Korovilas (1999) argues that many Albanian small 
businesses were formed after their owners had worked for some time in northern Greece. 
Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) find that 20% of investment in microenterprises, or $1.85 
billion, had been paid for by workers’ remittances in forty-four urban areas in Mexico, 
confirming previous research by Massey and Parrado (1998.) We found in our informal 
survey of diasporan Armenians that 12 of the 53 Armenians surveyed working in the 
Moscow area reported that they either have already or intend to invest in Armenia. 
 
It seems natural to assume that an increase in remittances would increase consumption, 
but the question is by how much.  According to the permanent income hypothesis, an 
increase in income will increase consumption more, the more reliable or less volatile is 
the source of that income.  Households will save more when income is more volatile. 
Adams (1991) finds in a sample of Egyptian households that migrants saved most income 
earned abroad, regarding it as temporary as opposed to permanent income; 54% of 
remittance earnings were spent on housing construction and repair; and almost all other 
investment was purchase of agricultural or building land. Adams (1998) finds in a panel 
dataset of rural Pakistani families that there is a higher marginal propensity to invest out 
of remittance income than other income, again indicating that remittances are viewed as 
temporary income. He also finds that the Pakistani families were significantly more likely 
to invest out of external remittance income than internal remittance income. Adams 
(2002) studied the precautionary saving behavior of Pakistani households in response to 
income from seven different sources. His results indicate that remittances are seven times 
more likely to be saved than income from renting land.  Puri and Ritzema (1999) review 
the evidence for a variety of Asian economies and conclude that marginal propensities to 
consume from remittances are small: “It is quite possible that migrant families consider 
remittances only as a transitory income and tend to save as much as possible.”  
 
The empirical evidence suggests that remittances are often perceived as transitory 
income, and the marginal propensity to save from remittances is very high. We can 
conclude that remittances do promote investment. However, investment is usually made 
into real assets such as housing, land, and shops rather than formal-sector financial 
                                                 
40 The IOM study suggests that Guatemalan households save a high proportion of remittances into financial 
assets. There may be differences across these studies in definition and coverage of categories. 
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instruments. This may reflect poor development of financial markets and institutions 
and/or lack of access of many remittance-receiving families to the financial sector.41 
 
In the case of Armenia, we can distinguish between several types of remittance flows that 
appear in figure 4.2 above: 
 
• Flow A: remittances from temporary workers. These are likely to be devoted 
almost exclusively to financing Armenian household consumption. 
• Flow B: savings brought back by temporary workers. Given evidence from other 
countries, the propensity of the household to save out of this flow is high. Savings 
are devoted mostly to investment in housing and land. (See section on use of 
remittances below.) Flow B substantially exceeds flow A in the Armenian case 
but is not captured in official BOP statistics due to the lack of “grossing up” 
described in section 2. 
    The overall propensity to save out of income earned by Armenian temporary 
workers is likely to be quite high. Swamy (1985) notes that Asian temporary 
workers in the Middle East had very high marginal propensities to save partly 
because their food and shelter costs were covered by their employer. We found in 
our informal survey of Armenian temporary workers in Russia that such costs are 
also being covered by employers. 
• Flow C: remittances from emigrants (“new” diasporans). If this flow is stable 
enough to be considered by the household as a form of recurrent income, then it 
will be devoted largely to consumption. The more irregular these transfers are, the 
greater the propensity to save from them. These remittances may “decay” (decline 
over time) the longer the emigrant has left Armenia. 
• Flow D: savings brought back by returning emigrants. The propensity of the 
household to save out of this flow is very high. The amount that an individual 
returnee brings back is likely to be substantial, but in aggregate they are probably 
not very significant given a low return rate of emigrants. This flow is measured in 
the BOP as migrants transfers; the Armenian NSS has only recently started to try 
to measure it. 
• Flow E: remittances from “old” diaspora relatives. These relatives will often be 
distant. Household use of this flow will again depend on whether it is fairly 
regular or intermittent, with the propensity to save rising with the degree of 
irregularity. Remittances from old diaspora relatives are likely to be significantly 
more irregular than remittances from new diaspora emigrants. 
 
4.5  Labor Supply, Education, and the Brain Drain 
 
A key question concerning remittances is whether they impact the labor supply of 
household members who do not emigrate. Remittances could lower labor supply by 
enabling family members to enjoy leisure. They could also lower labor supply by 
                                                 
41 An interesting, and exceptional, situation is that of Albania in the mid-1990s. Korovilas (1999) argues 
that remittances were the main source of the high growth experienced in Albania prior to 1998, and that 
remittances fueled the pyramid schemes whose collapse brought an end to that growth. 
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permitting family members to be educated. These two impacts have very different 
implications for growth and development. The empirical evidence that is available 
suggests that remittances have both effects. Itzigsohn (1995) finds that for households in 
four Caribbean Basin countries (Haiti, Jamaica, Guatemala, and Dominican Republic), 
receipt of remittances lowers the probability that the head of the household will 
participate in the labor market, possibly indicating an increase in leisure. Ahlburg (1991) 
finds that labor force participation of American Samoans receiving remittances is lower 
that that of those not receiving remittances. The limited evidence available suggests that 
remittance receipt lowers labor effort of household adults. 
 
On the other hand, Edwards and Ureta (2003) find that remittances play an important role 
in keeping children in school and thus financing human capital accumulation. Using data 
on a sample of 8387 families in El Salvador, they find that in rural and (especially) urban 
areas, receipt of remittances substantially reduces the hazard rate of a family’s child 
leaving school, and the impact of remittances is much greater than that of other types of 
income.42 Hanson and Woodruff (2003) find that Mexican children in households with an 
emigrant working abroad complete significantly more years of schooling. Yang (2004) 
shows that remittances reduce child labor supply.  Swamy (1985) summarizes evidence 
from the Phillipines that households sharply increased spending on education after 
starting to receive remittance income (pp.40-1.) 
 
These findings suggest that remittances might have a negative impact on labor supply of 
older family members beyond schooling age, but that they have a positive impact on 
keeping children in school. For a country like Armenia, where child labor is not 
apparently an important issue, remittances are more likely to improve the quality of a 
child’s education rather than the quantity. 
 
A major issue for developing countries that has received much attention over many 
decades is the “brain drain,” or the emigration of better-educated, higher-skilled workers 
to richer countries and its impacts. Assessing the impacts of brain drain in detail is 
outside the scope of this study. A recent overview paper argues that “[a]ccording to most 
existing studies, it is unlikely that remittances, return migration or other ways through 
which highly-skilled emigrants continue to impact on their home country's economy are 
significant enough to compensate sending countries for the losses induced by the brain 
drain.” 43 Although emigration is not always permanent, and some emigrants return and 
invest in the economy, bring back skills learned abroad, and possibly create trade 
networks between host and home countries, the evidence appears to be that emigration 
losses to the labor supply are not compensated by an increase in remittances or these 
other possible positive externalities. 
 
There is little doubt that in the case of Armenia, the labor removed from the country is 
highly educated.  More than half of its emigrants have more than 12 years of education, 
approximately on a par with the share of college-educated emigrants from China or 
                                                 
42 They show, for example, that a child in 7th grade in a family receiving a remittance of $100 per month is 
25% less likely to drop out of school. 
43 Docquier and Rapoport (2004.)  
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Turkey and more than from other labor-exporting transition economies like Albania 
(38%) or Croatia (41%): 
 
Table 4.4  Emigrants From Armenia in 2000 
Educational level attained Number of emigrants 
0-8 years  3,815 (8.6%) 
9-12 years 17,975 (40.5%) 
Greater than 12 years 22,590 (50.9%) 
Total 44,380 (100.0%) 
Source: Adams (2003.) 
 
4.6  Short-Run Macroeconomic Impacts 
 
Traditionally, analysis of the short-run macroeconomic impacts of remittances focused on 
their multiplier impacts. A range of estimates were developed for different countries. 
Glytsos (1993), for example, estimates a multiplier of 1.7 for Greece. The impact of 
remittances on external balance and exchange rates also received attention. Remittances 
will undoubtedly improve the current account of a country, providing it with a source of 
foreign exchange. This will be less true in a dollarized economy, but otherwise household 
purchases of remittance recipients are most likely to occur in the local currency.  
 
Considerable attention is now given to the impact of remittance flows on short-run 
macroeconomic stability. A remittance inflow will typically lead to an appreciation of the 
local currency. In this sense remittances are analogous to increases in private or public 
foreign capital flows. However, some of the inflow of remittances will flow back out 
through imports, particularly if domestic production is unable to expand sufficiently (with 
goods people want to buy.) Just as exporting natural resources can induce “Dutch 
disease” by making the country’s manufactured goods less competitive and inducing a 
persistent trade deficit, so too can exporting labor lead to a trade deficit.  This is 
particularly true when remittances lead to higher inflation because they are used to 
purchase non-tradable goods. Dutch disease is particularly harmful for families that do 
not receive remittances. Remittances also relieve pressure on central banks to defend 
currencies from speculative attack, allowing interest rates to be lower and capital 
formation higher. Neyapti has shown that the flow of remittances into developed 
countries is more stable that foreign direct investment, but the same cannot be said for 
less developed countries.44  This is likely due to frequent shifts in economic conditions in 
the recipient country. This calls into question one of the benefits of remittances – that 
they are more certain as a source of foreign exchange. 
 
Appendix C attempts to use a structural macroeconometric model developed for the 
Armenian economy to analyze the short-run macroeconomic impacts of remittance flows.  
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Bilin Neyapti, “Trends in Workers Remittances.” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade. 40(2), March-
April 2004, pp. 83-90. 
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4.7  Longer-Run Impact on Growth and Development 
 
Research on the impact of remittances on longer-run growth and development is scarce. 
On the one hand, remittances do increase investment in physical and human capital. On 
the other hand, remittances are unrequited transfers and introduce moral hazard problems 
that can negatively impact labor supply, investment, and government policymaking. An 
important recent study by Chami et al (2003) develops a theoretical model of remittances 
and labor supply in which moral hazard is present and show that remittances should be 
countercyclical and can have a negative impact on economic growth. They then analyze a 
panel dataset spanning 113 countries during the period 1970-1998 and show that 
empirically, remittances are countercyclical and are negatively correlated with growth. 
This is an important finding. More research is needed, however. The remittance data that 
Chami et al use apparently includes only the BOP category labeled “workers’ 
remittances.”45 As we have shown in section 2, this is in fact only one component of what 
should be considered as remittances from the viewpoint of growth and development. 
Leaving out non-emigrant (temporary worker) remittances is of particular concern, as 
most countries with significant “workers’ remittances” will have significant non-emigrant 
remittances. It will also be useful to carry out direct examinations of whether remittances 
reduce labor effort. The very limited evidence available suggests that they do (see section 
4.5), but more needs to be done on this. At this point, it is premature to make any 
conclusions about the longer-run impact of remittances on growth and development. 
 
4.8  Impacts on Poverty and Inequality: Overview 
 
The impact of remittances on poverty and inequality has been empirically researched for 
a long time. Under plausible assumptions, remittances will theoretically reduce poverty. 
In a recent study using panel data on 74 developing/transition countries, Adams and Page 
(2003) find that remittances have a strong, statistically significant impact on reducing 
poverty. This impact comes from both increasing the average level of income and making 
income distribution more equal. 46 
 
Theory does not give firm predictions on whether remittances can be expected to increase 
or decrease inequality. The simplest way to empirically evaluate remittance impact on 
inequality is to evaluate tables showing distribution of total income and remittance 
income across decile or quintile household groups. Adams (1998) evaluates quintile 
income group tables for a sample of 469 rural Pakistani households, finds that the richest 
families benefit disproportionately from remittance flows, and concludes that this is so 
because of the high costs of migrating to external labor markets. However, this simple 
approach can be very misleading; in fact, we will show below using Armenia as a case 
study that it is more likely to be misleading than not. A more sophisticated way to 
                                                 
45 For example, their dataset has official remittances in Armenia averaging 0.5% of GDP during 1995-98. 
This clearly can only be “workers’ remittances,” which equaled $10m in 1998, or 0.5% of GDP. Including 
temporary worker remittances and/or diasporan transfers, both of which are much larger than “workers’ 
remittances,” would have remittances be a much higher percentage of GDP. 
46 As in the case of the Chami et al (2003) study, the remittance data used in this study apparently include 
only “workers’ remittances” and not non-emigrant remittances or remittances included in “other private 
transfers.” 
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approach this question is to calculate inequality measures for household incomes 
excluding remittance income and including remittance income: if the inequality measure 
falls when remittance income is included, then they reduce inequality. Several studies 
have applied this methodology to household income data obtained from surveys. 
 
The most sophisticated way to assess remittance impact on inequality is to develop a 
counterfactual baseline scenario that describes what emigrants would have done in their 
home country if they had not emigrated. Adams (1989) compares Gini coefficients on 
actual household income and a no-migration counterfactual alternative and finds that 
external remittances increased income inequality for a sample of 1000 Egyptian 
households because the richest families benefit disproportionately from remittance 
income. Barham and Boucher (1998) develop an even more sophisticated no-migration 
counterfactual scenario using data from a survey of households in Nicaragua. They find 
that if one simply excludes remittances from income and does not develop a no-migration 
scenario, the Gini coefficient rises, so that remittances reduce inequality; but it their no-
migration scenario is incorporated, the Gini falls, so that remittances increase inequality. 
This shows how important including a no-migration scenario can be. 
 
Other subtleties come into play when assessing remittance impact on inequality. Jones 
(1998) argues that migration’s impact on inequality will change over time, because 
migration goes through distinct stages: innovator stage (only most ambitious and 
adventuresome people positively selected from families already well-off), early adopter 
phase (migration diffuses down the income distribution and reaches a large group of 
families), late adopter phase (community stratifies into a better-off migrant class and non-
migrant class.) Stark et al (1988) carry out Gini coefficient analysis that supports Jones’ 
contention. They apply a very useful decomposition of the Gini coefficient to data on 61 
households in two Mexican villages and conclude that “the impact of migrant remittances 
on (recipient village) income distribution depends critically on the degree to which 
migration opportunities of different types become diffused through a village population, 
as well as on the returns to human capital embedded in migrants’ remittances and on the 
distribution of potentially remittance-enhancing skills and education across village 
households.” (p.319) 
 
4.9  Access to and Quality of International Labor Markets 
 
Those favoring the “new theory of migration” point out many pieces of evidence that 
show increasing remittances to the family of emigrants with the educational level of the 
emigrant.47  Some have chosen to call this evidence of a repayment of principal and 
interest for the education the emigrant receives; others believe that families are using 
emigration and remittances as a form of insurance against crop failures or unemployment 
in the home country; and to a third strand, they alleviate the liquidity constraint that many 
families face in countries with highly imperfect financial markets. This last point, 
however, creates a real issue for countries like Armenia. If credit markets are imperfect 
and the costs of emigration are high, it is unlikely that poorer families are able to take 
advantage of opportunities to emigrate. For this reason, many studies conclude that 
                                                 
47 See for example Lucas and Stark (1985.) 
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emigration may increase income inequality. Access to international labor markets is an 
important issue, and poor households will take measures to reduce costs or employ 
creative ways to get around financing constraints.48 One approach is for a group of poor 
households to pool their funds to enable one person to emigrate. We will evaluate below 
whether poor households in Armenia appear to be shut out of international labor markets. 
 
Another important question concerns the quality of international labor markets. Emigrant 
labor has long been known to suffer some degree of exploitation. There are reports in 
Armenia of labor slavery, of women (often for sexual exploitation) but also of men. We 
were told by the head of one well-informed NGO that this is happening to Armenians 
primarily in the Gulf countries, Turkey, and Germany. 
 
4.10  A Snapshot of Microeconomic Remittance Impacts in Armenia 
 
Data on remittance transfers and recipient households is readily available for Armenia. A 
survey of households has been carried out in 1996, 1999, and annually since 2001 by the 
NSS with support from the World Bank.  Several thousand households have been 
surveyed each year in several rural and urban districts in Armenia.49 The survey provides 
detailed information on household geographic, demographic, and economic 
characteristics, including a range of data on agricultural activities and assets, residential 
assets, education, health, savings and debts, social assistance, intra- and interhousehold 
monetary and commodity transfers, and migration and remittance transfers. Detailed 
information is also collected for each household’s incomes and expenditures through a 
one-month diary that intends to record all incomes and expenditures by type and amount. 
20 different types of incomes are distinguished in the diary, including remittance 
transfers. 
 
There are two sources of information in the survey on remittance transfer receipts. The 
household is asked in section F of the survey about receipt of money or goods from 
absent members over the past 12 months, including where the absent member lives 
(Russia, a non-Russia CIS country, another European country, USA or Canada, and 
other) and the total value of money or goods received. The second source is the income 
and expenditure diary, in which cash received from relatives living out of Armenia during 
the month that incomes are monitored is recorded (this income data is in section Y of the 
survey.)50 As noted in section II, The NSS uses these data to construct balance-of-
payments estimates of remittance transfers. During interviews with Armenian and 
international economists familiar with the survey, the view was often expressed that 
reported incomes are less than actual incomes, particularly in the case of remittance 
transfers, due to concerns about taxation and visibility in the local community and 
potential jealousy and pressure to share such income. These experts generally stressed 
                                                 
48 The cost of a typical Armenian emigrant going to Russia is $500 for airfare and initial settling costs. 
Rural emigrants now often take the bus to cut travel costs. 
49 Details on characteristics of the survey, including sampling methodology, geographical locations of 
sampled households, and other pertinent details can be found in Brown (2003) (especially pp.38-39 and 55-
56), and  
50 Sections F and Y also contain information on internal remittances (transfers received from relatives 
living in Armenia.) 
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that the expenditure data were more reliable than income data, as is classically the case 
with household budget surveys around the world. It is, however, inevitable that analysts 
will focus considerable attention on the income data.51 Efforts to improve accuracy of 
collected income data will have a high research payoff.52 
 
The distribution of transfers received over 12 months according to country of origin is 
described in table 4.5 below. The large majority of transfers to Armenian households 
came from Russia, which accounted for 68% of the value of all transfers, and 14% of 
surveyed households receiving transfers from there. The next most important region was 
USA/Canada, with 17% of total transfer value and 2% of surveyed households receiving 
transfers from there. As one would expect, the average value of transfers was higher in 
the case of USA/Canada and European countries than for Russia and CIS countries: the 
average for USA/Canada was 50% higher than for Russia.53 
 
Table 4.5 
Data from HLS Section F : Remittance Transfers Received Over Past 12 Months 
Total value of transfers
 
Average value of 
transfers per household 
Country where 
transfer 
originated 
Number of 
surveyed 
households 
receiving 
transfer 
 
(as % of 
households 
surveyed)A 
1000 dram USD 
 
Dram USD 
Any region 852 18% 167,923 $293,059 
(100%) 
193,459 $338 
  Russia 629 14% 114,498 $199,823 
(68%) 
182,032 $318 
  Other CIS 
country 
42 1% 7,220 $12,600 
(4%) 
171,904 $300 
  Other European 
country 
73 2% 15,434 $26,936 
(9%) 
211,427 $369 
  USA or Canada 105 2% 28,885 $50,411 
(17%) 
275,098 $480 
  OtherB 19 0% 1,885 $3,290 
(1%) 
99,205 $173 
Source : Calculated from raw data of section F of 2002 HLS (section F asks households about 
amount of transfers received over previous 12 months.) 
A : Total number of households surveyed in 2002 HLS was 4,634. Regional percentages do not 
add up to total because some households received transfers from more than one region. 
                                                 
51 In the Armenian case, there are already three studies that make heavy use of the HLS income data: 
Murrugarra’s (2002) study of public transfers, remittances, and health care demand, Brown’s (2003) study 
of tax policy and poverty, and this study. 
52 Another data issue is the fact that because the survey only collects one month of income and expenditure 
observations for each household, the permanent versus temporary income issue can become acute in some 
cases. For example, one household in the 2002 HLS reported as its only income cash received from the sale 
of valuables. Although the amount was quite high and put the household in an upper income decile group, 
it is likely that this household’s permanent income is much lower. NSS calculates total household income 
by simply summing up all recorded monthly incomes. However, given that the survey asks the household if 
a received income is periodic or not, it should be possible to make an estimate of permanent income. 
53 However, a 50% differential seems rather low given the income differential between North American and 
Russia. 
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B : Country outside of Armenia not in CIS, Europe, or North America. 
 
There is an interesting segmentation between households receiving transfers from 
USA/Canada and Russia/CIS. Only 14 households received transfers from both regions. 
 
The geographical distribution of households receiving transfers is described in table 4.6 
below. Interestingly, the same percentage of households in Yerevan, non-Yerevan urban 
regions and rural regions received transfer income. However, rural regions benefited 
relatively more from Russia transfers and Yerevan from western transfers, with non-
Yerevan urban households in-between.  
 
Table 4.6 
Data from HLS Section F : Remittance Transfers Received Over Past 12 Months 
Number of households receiving: 
Of which: 
Household located 
in: 
  
Total number 
of households 
surveyed 
Remittance 
from foreign 
country 
Originating 
in 
Russia/CIS
Originating in 
Europe/North 
America 
Yerevan 
 
1404 
 
253 
(18%) 
170 
(12%) 
92 
(7%) 
Non-Yerevan urban 
 
1413 
 
246 
(17%) 
199 
(14%) 
49 
(3%) 
Rural 
 
1817 
 
334 
(18%) 
302 
(17%) 
35 
(2%) 
Value of average remittance in dram (USD) 
Yerevan 
  
247,109 
($431) 
205,340 
($358) 
300,117 
($524) 
Non-Yerevan urban 
  
196,886 
($344) 
201,510 
($352) 
170,073 
($297) 
Rural 
  
164,926 
($288) 
154,669 
($270) 
239,289 
($418) 
 
 
4.11  Impact of External Transfers on Inequality 
 
One way to evaluate the impact of external transfers on inequality is to compare 
inequality measures for income including and excluding external transfers.54 The table 
below shows that the Gini coefficient rises when external transfers are excluded, and 
external transfers thus reduce inequality: 
 
 
                                                 
54 This approach was taken by Ahlburg (1996) and Taylor (1992) using survey data on Tongan families and 
rural Mexican families respectively. Both found that remittance transfers lowered income inequality as 
measured by Gini coefficients, similar to our finding using Armenian data. Taylor also evaluated the 
indirect impact of remittances through the financing of household investment in livestock and increased 
income over time; this effect was found to reduce inequality. 
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Gini Coefficients for Monthly Household Income  
Including external transfer income 0.489 
Excluding external transfer income 0.495 
  
Average monthly income for:  
  Households not receiving external transfer 37,323 
  Households receiving external transfer : with transfer 85,932 
  Households receiving external transfer : without transfer 20,604 
  Average monthly transfer size 65,328 
  -as % of total monthly income 76% 
 
The reason why this is happening is straightforward. For households reporting external 
transfer income in the survey, external transfers comprise 76% of their monthly income. 
The table above shows that external transfers move these households’ average income 
level from a very low level to a very high level. Many of the households receiving 
external transfers are in the highest income deciles of the sample – and if they did not 
receive external transfers, they would be in the lowest deciles. The table below shows the 
distribution of households receiving external transfers according to the share of external 
transfers in total income. Remarkably, 23% of these households reported no other income 
source except external transfers: 
 
 
Share of external transfer 
income in total income: 
Number of 
households (as %) 
1%-9% 1 0.3% 
10%-19% 6 1.5% 
20%-29% 6 1.5% 
30%-39% 16 4.0% 
40%-49% 26 6.5% 
50%-59% 32 8.0% 
60%-69% 51 12.8% 
70%-79% 55 13.8% 
80%-89% 74 18.5% 
90%-99% 40 10.0% 
100% 93 23.3% 
   
1%-100% 400 100% 
 
This evidence does suggest that external transfers reduce inequality in Armenia, and they 
tend to confirm the widespread popular impression that many families receiving transfers 
consist of pensioners or mothers and children only. However, the evidence is not 
conclusive, because it does not accurately describe what would happen in the absence of 
external transfers. For families receiving external transfers from a family member 
working abroad, if that member could not work abroad, he/she would presumably try to 
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find employment in Armenia. To really show what would happen in the absence of 
migration and external transfers, we have to describe a no-migration counterfactual 
outcome. As discussed previously, studies have shown that taking into account a no-
migration counterfactual can produce a different picture. This must be left as a topic for 
future research.55 
 
                                                 
55 The HLS evidently contains the data necessary to implement the techniques used in Adams (1989) and 
Barham and Boucher (1998). The Armenian case is somewhat complicated by the fact that some 
externatransfers captured in the HLS are coming from “old” diaspora relatives. 
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5.  INITIATIVES REGARDING REMITTANCES AND DIASPORA LINKAGES 
 
5.1  Overview 
 
In this section, we evaluate a range of initiatives that could be undertaken to increase the 
volume of remittances and enhance their impact on economic growth and development. 
We also review initiatives that can strengthen linkages between Armenia and its diaspora 
communities and intensify diasporan economic involvement. Diasporas contribute to 
their home country not only through monetary remittances, but also through direct 
investment and non-monetary contributions such as human capital transfers, technology 
transfer, trade opportunities, and market opening. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that there are two distinct types of Armenian diaspora 
communities. Diasporan communities are either “old” (descended from Armenians who 
left Armenia long ago or fled Turkey in 1915) or “new” (emigrants who began to leave 
Armenia starting from the Gorbachev era.) Generally speaking, diasporan communities 
living outside of the CIS are old diaspora, and communities living inside the CIS are new 
diaspora (although a significant number of new disaporans live in Europe and North 
America.) The old diaspora is highly organized and has long-established institutions 
representing it politically, socially, and economically. Its capacities to take collective 
action on behalf of Armenia are high. The new diaspora is much less well organized. 
Nonetheless, civic institutions have formed in the new diasporas in recent times. Our 
informal survey interviewed 8 such diasporan organizations in Moscow and 7 in Rostov; 
some details on these organizations are given in appendix B. 
 
5.2  Data and Research Issues 
 
Reports on remittances have emphasized the importance of improving the knowledge 
base on remittances and their economic impacts, and the situation is the same in the 
Armenian case. Although this report has made some contributions to knowledge on 
Armenian remittance flows, much needs to be done. 
 
• Data quality, availability, and accessibility should be improved. This can be 
accomplished through the following actions: 
 
a). The IMF and World Bank need to work with the Armenian Government to review and 
improve the quality of data and methodologies used to estimate remittances. Although the 
NSS is doing a very good job with the resources available to it, some improvements 
could be made at low or no cost (see section 2.) The NSS is also using data sources that 
are not available on a regular basis (special surveys), and it would be worthwhile to assist 
the NSS to update that information, particularly as the information sheds light on how 
remittances are used by Armenian households. 
 
b) The household survey (HLS) should be expanded to include questions on access to and 
use of the formal financial sector. This does not have to be done annually. (Doing this 
even on a one-time-only basis would be useful.) 
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c) The problem of underreporting of remittance transfers in the HLS needs to be 
addressed. Every effort should be made, and creative approaches taken, to encourage 
households to accurately report their incomes to the survey. 
 
d) The NSS should provide easier access to HLS data. The HLS data must be requested 
from the NSS. The World Bank web site page that provides information on HLSs that it 
supports around the world notes that for Armenia and some other countries, “a substantial 
proportion of data requests have been denied, left unanswered, or answered affirmatively 
only after substantial delays.”56 HLS data should be made widely available to researchers 
and the public by posting it on the World Bank web site. 
  
e) An Armenian migration survey should be carried out by an organization experienced 
in this activity. Little systematic data is available on this topic that is so important to 
Armenia. The IOM offers a good template for a migration survey. This template should 
be augmented with questions aimed at illuminating remittances and their impacts. 
 
f). Microfinance institutions are in a good position to gather information at low cost on 
remittance flows and access to the formal financial system. They typically interact with a 
large number of clients at lower levels of income dispersed over a wide geographic area. 
The USAID MEDI project can assist with this effort. 
 
• More research should be carried out on the characteristics, uses, and impacts of 
remittances, and this research should inform public policies and donor activities. 
 
a) A very valuable database, the household survey, is already available to carry out such 
research, and previous research that provides a guide to doing such research has been 
identified in this paper. HLS data should be used to carefully analyze: 
 
o The inequality impacts of remittances. A study could be done developing a 
no-migration counterfactual scenario. It might also be possible to do a study 
using the approach of Stark et al (1988) to assess where Armenian 
communities are in the emigration lifecycle; 
o The characteristics of households receiving remittances, and the impact of 
remittances on labor supply; 
o The impact of remittances on savings and/or physical capital accumulation; 
o The impact of remittances on education. 
 
b) In order to inform public policies, it is not enough simply to carry out research and 
produce papers. The research must reach a domestic Armenian audience, including 
government policymakers. Armenia needs a think-tank that is staffed by qualified 
economists capable of understanding and producing quality research (particularly 
quantitative research.) Such a think-tank should be supported by a group of highly-
qualified western economists who will work collaboratively with the Armenian 
researchers and provide peer review. It is essential that the think-tank have effective 
channels of communication with government officials and the media. It is also essential 
                                                 
56 See http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/  
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that the think-tank become institutionalized, sustainable, and viewed as an asset to the 
Armenian government and public. Resources are in place that can support achieving this 
goal, for example the American University of Armenia and the Armenian International 
Policy Research Group (existing think-tanks should also be carefully evaluated.) Models 
for effective think-tanks already exist in several transition countries.57 
 
5.3  Initiatives Specific to Monetary Remittances 
 
Generally speaking, initiatives affecting remittances can affect three things: the volume 
of remittances, the use (allocation) of remittances, and the distribution of and access to 
remittances. It is quite conceivable that a particular initiative could affect more than one 
of these. One key point that must be respected about remittances is that they are small-
scale private transfers that are completely under the control of households, and efforts to 
increase their volume and/or alter their allocation must rely on changing incentives in an 
effort to correct a market failure or promote competition. 
 
Areas where initiatives could be undertaken are: 
 
• Lowering transactions costs. Given the emergence of the Anelik and UniBank 
operations, formal-sector transactions costs are not an important issue with respect to 
remittances from CIS diaspora communities. However, fees are rather high on 
remittances from western countries. The remittance transfer market is apparently 
segmented, and if Anelik and UniBank could compete in the western-country market, 
transfer costs would fall. Our overall impression is that market-driven processes are 
working rather well in Armenia and that trust and confidence in the banking system is 
much more important than transfer costs. 
 
• Extending the availability of financial services to poor people and rural areas. The 
extent to which various population groups lack access to the formal financial sector is 
not yet clear. Armenia is a small country with a reasonably well-developed transport 
network. Data needs to be collected through the household survey, microfinance 
institutions, and other channels in order to assess whether access is an important issue 
or not. One measure that should be undertaken in any event that would enhance such 
availability to poor people and rural areas, enhancing microfinance institutions, is 
discussed below. 
 
• Bringing remittances into the formal financial sector. It is often argued that this 
should be an important goal of programs to enhance remittances and their impacts on 
growth development. However, empirical evidence on remittance use suggests that a 
large proportion of remittances are in fact already saved into housing, land, education, 
and small businesses. There are two arguments that can justify seeking to bring more 
remittances into the formal financial sector. First, financial institutions should have a 
much wider knowledge of productive investments than an individual family and 
should be able to identify investment projects providing higher returns. Second, these 
                                                 
57 See Struyk (2002) on the development and management of public-policy think tanks in transition 
countries. 
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higher returns should attract an even higher level of investment than currently 
prevails. For these arguments to work, it must be the case that the financial sector is 
functioning well. Transition financial sectors are plagued with well-known problems 
that hurt efficiency, erode public trust, and lead to low levels of financial 
intermediation. The level of intermediation in Armenia is low even in comparison 
with other transition economies (see Grigorian 2003.) 
 
a) USAID and other donors have already funded several projects that are designed to 
directly strengthen the financial sector, including (for example) banking supervision 
projects, microfinance and SME lending projects, and capital market projects. 
Projects assisting the government to develop economic analytical capacities indirectly 
support this effort by aiding the maintenance of macroeconomic stability and 
resistance to introducing distortionary policies that could lead to financial repression. 
Grigorian (2003) outlines a series of measures that he believes are now necessary to 
further strengthen the Armenian banking sector, and the programmatic implications 
of these measures should be evaluated. Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets that 
can rapidly speed up strengthening of the banking sector, and many of the initiatives 
that would be helpful require exertion of serious political will. The collapse of 
confidence in formal financial institutions during early transition is taking a long time 
to rebuild in all transition countries. There are signs that the Armenian banking sector 
and the products that it offers are developing along lines seen earlier in more 
advanced transition economies.58 The most important action that donors can take is 
arguably to continue to adhere to the set course and be patient. 
 
b) Enabling microfinance institutions (MFIs) to expand their range of services. MFIs 
offer a promising opportunity to bring remittances into financial institutions. Some 
(many?) clients of MFI lending programs receive remittances, and they are reluctant 
to save into banks due to trust issues. They also believe that the amounts that they can 
deposit are too small to interest commercial banks. However, they know their MFI 
lender well and trust it, and many are interested in saving funds in it. In Armenia, 
MFIs cannot take deposits.59 MFIs are reluctant to become commercial banks, 
because they do not want to implement collateral requirements, they are often 
offspring of international NGOs that operate with some noncommercial objectives, 
and the regulatory burden required by Central Bank regulations will be far too high. 
MFIs offer an important opportunity to both bring more remittances into formal 
savings institutions and increase services to poor and rural households, but until 
current problems are resolved, they are prevented from realizing that opportunity. 
USAID has already established a project to address these problems, the MEDI 
project. MEDI has a target date of October 2005 to straighten out the legal framework 
and provide legal means to convert MFIs into commercial financial institutions. They 
are also working with some MFIs to strengthen their capacities to become 
commercial financial institutions and handle new sources of money. 
 
                                                 
58 For example, some banks have recently introduced mortgage and consumer appliance loans, and are 
working intensively with large corporate borrowers to develop new loan activity with them. 
59 In fact, MFIs’ registration with the Ministry of Justice could be legally interpreted away.  
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• Encouraging the formation of Hometown Associations. Hometown Associations 
(HTAs) are voluntary civic associations of emigrants who come from the same town 
or region of their home country.60 They grew rapidly in the 1990s and have become 
prominent among Mexican and other Latin American emigrant groups working in the 
United States. HTAs typically pool contributions from emigrants to fund projects in 
health, education, public infrastructure (roads, utilities, churches, cemeteries,) and 
recreation. They play an active role in identifying, planning, and implementing these 
projects. HTAs have not so far been much involved in funding “productive” 
(business) projects that directly generate income and employment. HTAs typically 
have limited fundraising abilities but often work in very small communities in which 
their contributions are very large compared to municipal public works budgets. An 
important merit of HTA projects is that they are fully “owned” by the funders and 
communities receiving them. In recent years, the Mexican and El Salvadorean 
governments have begun formal programs to match HTA donations with public 
funds. Sustainability of HTA-funded projects is an emerging critical issue. 
 
The possibility of Armenian HTAs emerging is intriguing. HTAs are relevant mainly to 
the “new” diaspora, located mainly in Russia, rather than the “old” diaspora. Most old 
diasporans with ties to Armenians have ties to individuals or families, not communities, 
whereas cities in Russia with concentrations of new diasporans may have clusters of 
people from the same community living in close proximity. We did not find any evidence 
that HTA-type organizations have yet formed in Moscow or Rostov. However, 
Armenians do have a clear sense of identification with their hometown, and HTA 
emergence is possible. 
 
Donor and government engagement with HTAs has been to work with existing HTAs to 
develop their project identification and implementation skills, fundraising abilities, and 
governance.61 Engagement has not sought to encourage the formation of HTAs. At this 
point, engagement in the Armenian case would have to be of that nature, given that 
Armenian HTAs do not yet exist. The new (Russian) diaspora does have civic 
organizations and actors with whom it would be worthwhile to initiate a dialogue on 
prospects for forming HTAs. Appendix B lists some of these organizations, some of 
which might be incipient HTAs. A risk of donor involvement in encouraging formation 
of HTAs is that they would be formed for rent-seeking purposes. 
 
One possibility for engaging the old diaspora in HTA-like efforts is the formation of 
groups of old diasporans who “adopt” a specific town or community in Armenia. The 
chances of this approach working well are less than in the case of real HTAs, given that 
old diasporans and the Armenian community will not have the same sense of 
identification and ownership and will lack informal monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms deriving from membership in a common community. 
 
                                                 
60 References on Hometown Associations include Orozco (2003), Orozco (2004), and chapter 2 of Johnson 
and Sedaca (2004). 
61 A comprehensive review of donor and government engagement is given in Johnson and Sedaca (2004), 
pp.24-29. 
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• Establish a much more ambitious “National Community Funds Program.” Such a 
program is described in detail in Mussig (2002.) This program seeks to enhance the 
volume of remittances by eliminating fees charged on transfer, and affect use of 
remittances by channeling them into a community funds program that would invest in 
productive business projects, productive infrastructure, social investments, and 
personal loans. Many communities would channel remittances into this scheme. A 
community funds program is like a supercharged HTA that pools together many 
communities’ resources and invests in a broad portfolio of projects. The scheme does 
raise important governance issues. Given that individual HTAs have not yet formed, 
it is too premature to consider it for Armenia. 
 
• Taking measures to facilitate, monitor and regulate temporary and long-term 
migration, and increase access of population groups to international labor markets. 
Migration and remittances are obviously linked, and measures that impact migration 
will also impact remittances. Review of such measures and recommendations on them 
are beyond the scope of this paper. Many international organizations, including the 
International Organization for Migration in particular, have an extensive literature on 
these issues. 
 
• Establishing remittance-backed bonds through securitization of future remittance 
flows. This concept is described in Johnson and Sedaca (2004, p.52). Remittance-
backed bonds enable countries to raise funds at lower interest rates on international 
bond markets. They have been issued in several countries: Brazil, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Panama, and Turkey. This initiative might be premature for Armenia, given 
that none of its financial institutions have experience with issuing bonds on 
international markets. Grigorian (2003) also notes that if economic conditions are 
correlated between the remittance-sending and remittance-receiving country, 
remittance-backed bonds could put a country in a financial bind. Economic conditions 
are probably significantly correlated between Armenia and Russia. The idea of 
remittance-backed bonds for Armenia is very intriguing but needs to be evaluated 
cautiously. 
 
5.4  Initiatives to Enhance Linkages With the Diasporan Community 
 
In addition to initiatives specifically targeted at remittances, there is the question of what 
can be done to take fuller advantage of the potentialities of the diasporan communities 
with respect to things like human capital transfer, technology transfer, financial 
investment, trade opportunities and market openings. A recent study of the role of 
diasporas in facilitating poverty reduction in their home countries has identified six 
distinct models in which the diaspora focuses on maximizing remittance streams 
(Phillipines), facilitating HTAs (Mexico), channeling remittances into government 
channels (Eritrea), providing human capital (Taiwan), providing direct investment and 
trade opportunities (China), and providing direct and portfolio investment, technology 
transfer, market opening and outsourcing opportunities (India.)62 Over the past decade, 
                                                 
62 See Newland (2004.) 
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Armenia’s diaspora has made very significant contributions in some of these areas. It has 
also made contributions that are perhaps uniquely its own. The US diaspora, for example, 
founded, financed and managed the American University of Armenia. Armenian 
diasporas are generally well-organized and, if adequately motivated, capable of making 
major contributions to Armenian development.  
 
• Business Mentoring Program and SME Development 
In the 1990s, a great deal of business training was carried out in Armenia by a variety of 
international organizations, but results are felt to have fallen short with respect to actual 
establishment of new SMEs and associated employment and income creation. One 
natural initiative to pursue is enlisting experienced diasporan businesspeople to provide 
mentoring services to potential Armenian entrepreneurs. Potential entrepreneurs could be 
selected on the basis of proposed project quality and willingness to invest personal funds. 
The MBA program of the American University of Armenia could provide training to the 
potential entrepreneurs (AUA could in fact be the institution hosting the project.) 
Businesspeople willing to volunteer their time to work with the potential entrepreneurs 
could be recruited in the US by a diasporan organization. Matching financing could be 
provided to the entrepreneurs if their project looked promising and they are willing to 
invest their own funds. This initiative could straightforwardly be organized as a public-
private partnership, or GDA. The overriding goal would be to get new SMEs off the 
ground. 
 
Challenges involved in attracting adequate diasporan involvement in such an endeavour 
should not be underestimated, as illustrated by the experience of the Armenian SME 
Investment Fund. In response to a study done in 2000 showing that inadequate 
investment financing was available for SMEs, in 2002 the IFC sponsored the creation of 
an investment fund for SMEs and played a key role as a leading investor by contributing 
up to $5m to the fund. The Armenian diaspora and other interested investors were 
supposed to raise $15m more. The fund was intended to establish joint ventures with 
good multinational partners, and make investments in good existing SMEs that need 
capital to expand. A US-based private investment firm run by a member of the US 
diaspora was enlisted to manage the fund. In August 2004, the IFC withdrew its stake, 
and the fund became defunct. This was evidently due to an inability to reach the diaspora 
financing target of $15m, due to concerns that diasporans had over the Armenian 
government’s commitment to the initiative. However, in the business-mentoring initiative 
proposed above, the diaspora would be responsible primarily for providing human 
capital, not financing. 
 
• Pan-Armenian Development Bank 
The Pan-Armenian Development Bank concept is described in detail in Gevorkyan and 
Grigorian (2003) and Johnson and Sedaca (2004.) The goal would be to establish an 
investment fund involving mid- to large-scale diaspora investors that would be managed 
by experienced diapsoran professionals and would take equity investments in new or 
existing private companies. There are important challenges to implementing such a 
development bank, including diasporan investors’ requirement of a sound investment 
climate, and potential resistance to such a bank from Armenian domestic actors. The 
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recent experience of the Armenian SME Investment Fund suggests that the present 
moment is not propitious for attempting to establish such a bank. If and when that time 
comes, a good opportunity for a public-private partnership will have opened up. 
 
5.5  Donor Coordination 
 
Many international organizations and bilateral donor agencies are active in Armenia, and 
most of these are interested in various aspects of the remittance issue. Donor coordination 
is an important task. 
 
• Remittance Roundtable 
An initial “Remittance Roundtable” was held on August 5 2004 that brought together 
USAID, IMF, World Bank, IOM, UNDP, GTZ, TACIS, EBRD, and DfID to view an 
initial presentation and discuss the many issues surrounding remittances. This roundtable 
should be convened again. Donors need to work closely together to identify what 
initiatives are worth pursuing and how to form partnerships that can fund and implement 
those initiatives. 
 
• Millenium Challenge Account Funding 
Finally, it is necessary to make a general observation on public-sector capacities and 
recent developments in foreign aid to Armenia. Armenian public-sector capacities 
continue to require active development and strengthening, and it is important to maintain 
government focus and energy on this task. Donor agencies such as USAID, the World 
Bank, and others that have provided a great deal of technical assistance to the Armenian 
government over the past decade have enjoyed a degree of leverage to strengthen 
capacities enabled by their funding of projects. Armenia now faces the prospect of 
receiving several hundred million dollars of Millenium Challenge Account funding over 
the next five years. Given the size of the Armenian economy, this is an exceptionally 
large amount of funding, and it will be given to the government as grants mainly to 
finance infrastructure projects. It was our impression from talks with Armenian 
economists and other experts in Yerevan that this new foreign aid funding might distract 
government attention away from capacity building and undermine the leverage that donor 
agencies have enjoyed with regard to technical assistance and capacity building. This has 
implications for carrying out initiatives relating to remittances and diaspora linkage 
strengthening, particularly in instances when the Armenian government is involved. 
Coordination between the Millenium Challenge Corporation and other donor agencies 
seems highly advisable, indeed essential. It would be regrettable if funding flows based 
on achieving quality governance and implementing good policies undermined the efforts 
of other organizations to help the government achieve those goals. 
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Statistical Sources Consulted 
 
Household Living Survey 2002, raw data, National Statistics Service of the Republic of 
Armenia. 
 
“Income, Expenditure, and Food Consumption of the Population of the Republic of 
Armenia,” National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia, 2003. 
 
Balance of Payments data 1998-2003, National Statistics Service of the Republic of 
Armenia. 
 
“Survey of Arriving and Departing Passengers April-June 2002,” National Statistics 
Service of the Republic of Armenia. 
 
State Department for Migration and Refugees, “Number of Persons Arrived and Left in 
Armenia,” data posted on web site: http://www.dmr.am 
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Appendix A 
Armenian Migration and Diasporan Population Data 
 
Official data on entries and exits across Armenian national frontiers during 1992-2003 
are given in table A.1. For 1992-1999, only data on entries and exits through airports are 
available, but the government began to systematically collect data on all transport types 
starting in 2000. Balances for each year (entries minus exits) show that Armenia has 
always experienced a net outflow of people, and that this outflow was very large during 
the early 1990s but fell sharply once the conflict with Azerbaijan ended and the economy 
was stabilized in 1995. The sum of these balances over 1992-2003 gives a very good 
approximation to the actual net outflow of individuals from Armenia in that period. The 
outflow through airports alone was almost 700,000 people.63 This is a lower bound to 
total outflows, which can only be guessed at. If the proportion of highway to air travel in 
the 1990s was similar to that of 2000-01, then total net outflow was equal to roughly 1 
million people. 
 
Table A.1 
Total By Air By Rail By Highway 
Entries Exits Balance Entries Exits Balance Entries Exits Balance Entries Exits Balance 
             
1992 na na na 636900 865500 -228600 na na na na na na 
1993 na na na 689900 831000 -141100 na na na na na na 
1994 na na na 470000 597800 -127800 na na na na na na 
1995 na na na 469500 507000 -37500 na na na na na na 
1996 na na na 496900 517400 -20500 na na na na na na 
1997 na na na 473600 504900 -31300 na na na na na na 
1998 na na na 415300 439700 -24400 na na na na na na 
1999 na na na 311600 318600 -7000 na na na na na na 
2000 399663 457162 -57499 292800 318400 -25600 6058 19431 -13373 100805 119331 -18526 
2001 508211 568600 -60389 375900 399000 -23100 11561 30709 -19148 120750 138891 -18141 
2002 590654 593373 -2719 434000 438000 -4000 12657 18915 -6258 143997 136458 7539 
2003 618348 628509 -10161 458500 482000 -23500 12604 14021 -1417 147244 132488 14756 
             
Net 
outflow, 
1992-2003      -694400       
Net 
outflow, 
2000-2003   -130768   -76200   -40196   -14372 
Source: Data for 1992-1999 are from “Social and Economic Position of the Republic of Armenia, 2000”, 
National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia. Data for 2000-2004 are from the web site of the 
Department of Migration and Refugees, Government of Armenia: http://www.dmr.am  
 
                                                 
63 Note that these numbers might include entries of refugees from Azerbaijan - the high level of entries in 
1992 and 1993 probably reflect large inflows of refugees through airports. If a refugee arrived in Armenia 
and did not leave for another country, then he/she is counted as a net entry.  
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Net outflow through airports has been very stable since 1995, fluctuating around an 
average of roughly –20,000. Total net outflow in 2000 and 2001 was much higher than 
net outflow through airports, reflecting significant outflow through rail and highway. 
Overall, the data do show a massive net outflow of people from Armenia in the early 
1990s and continuing smaller net outflows since 1995. Total net outflows in 2000 and 
2001 were significant, but they fell sharply in 2002 and 2003 as economic growth rose 
dramatically. 
 
The figure below shows that there are strong seasonal patterns in entries and exits. Both 
are relatively low early in the year and rise through late summer. For each of the first 
three quarters of the year, exits exceed entries, and there is a net outflow from Armenia. 
In the last quarter of the year, exits from Armenia fall, but entries into Armenia remain at 
the same level of the third quarter, and there is a net inflow into Armenia, due at least in 
part to the return of temporary/seasonal workers from abroad. The drop in total net 
outflow in 2002 and 2003 was due to a rise in total net inflow in the last quarter of each 
year. This may indicate a shift towards more Armenians leaving for temporary/seasonal 
work rather than longer-term work. 
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Data are also available on estimates of Armenian diasporan populations. The total of 6-8 
million people is much larger than Armenia’s population of 3 million: 
 
Table A.2 
Russia 2,250,000 Yugoslavia 10,000 India 560 
Turkey* 2,080,000 Moldova 7,000 Albania 500 
United States 1,400,000 Egypt 6,500 Mexico 500 
Georgia 460,000 Tajikistan 6,000 Ethiopia 400 
France 450,000 Kuwait 5,000 Colombia 250 
Lebanon 234,000 Latvia 5,000 Monaco 200 
Syria 150,000 Sweden 5,000 South Africa 200 
Ukraine 150,000 Switzerland 5,000 Quatar 150 
Argentina 130,000 Kyrgyztan 3,285 Cuba 100 
Iran 100,000 Austria 3,000 Dominican Republic 75 
Poland 92,000 Denmark 3,000 Ireland 50 
Uzbekistan 70,000 Israel 3,000 Singapore 35 
Jordan 51,533 Netherlands 3,000 Zimbabwe 28 
Germany 42,000 Romania 3000 Costa Rica 20 
Canada 40,615 UAE 3,000 Ivory Coast 20 
Brazil 40,000 Cyprus 2,740 China 16 
Australia 35,000 Italy 2,500 Hong Kong 16 
Turkmenistan 32,000 Lithuania 2,500 Ghana 15 
Bulgaria 30,000 Venezuela 2,500 Senegal 15 
Belarus 25,000 Estonia 2,000 South Korea 12 
Kazakhstan 25,000 Chile 1,000 Indonesia 10 
Greece 20,000 Finland 1,000 Japan 10 
Iraq 20,000 Norway 1,000 Luxembourg 10 
Uruguay 19,000 Spain 1,000 Zambia 10 
United Kingdom 18,000 Sudan 1,000 Philippines 8 
Hungary 15,000 Thailand 1,000 Swaziland 8 
Belgium 10,000 Honduras 900 Vietnam 8 
Czech Republic 10,000 New Zealand 600   
Source: estimates provided by the AGBU organization. See 
http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/followup/population.html  
* : Value for Turkey includes an estimated 2,000,000 Armenians whose ancestors converted to 
Islam but who retain an Armenian ethnic identity. 
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Appendix B 
Armenian Civic Organizations in Moscow 
 
Name of organization Type of org.
Does org. 
finance 
projects in 
Armenia? 
To whom is money 
directed? 
Are business 
projects 
funded? 
Does org. fund social projects? 
 
SAR - The Union of Armenians in 
Russia (UAR)  Charity  Yes 
Directly to 
beneficiaries  
No, only 
technical 
assistance 
Funds a number of cultural, educational, 
scientific, publishing projects. Also supports 
orphans, elderly, refugees and IDPs in 
Armenia (donated 2 hostels) 
ARADES - Russian-Armenian 
business cooperation association 
Business/ 
political/ 
charity Yes 
Directly to 
beneficiaries 
Facilitates 
business 
development 
Organisation is newly established and intends 
to have a big impact on economic 
development.  
Russian Armenian Friendship Charity  Yes 
Directly to 
beneficiaries  No 
Funds some charitable projects to support the 
disadvantaged 
Ararat Cultural Centre Charity  Yes 
Directly to 
beneficiaries  No 
Funds some charitable projects to support the 
disadvantage  
Armenian Community of Moscow Charity  Yes 
Directly to 
beneficiaries  No 
Funds some charitable projects to support the 
disadvantage 
Lazarian Institute of Oriental 
Languages Educational Yes Ministry of Education No  
The Nakhichevan and Russian 
Dioceses  Religious   
Facilitates a 
few business 
ventures 
Donation to Edjmiatsin, sponsors Rus/Arm 
children trips to Armenia and cultural events  
Yerevan's Municipality in Moscow State/ charity Yes 
Directly to 
beneficiaries  Yes.  
Sponsors training of 50 Architects in 
Moscow, 100 people of other professions, 25 
Armenian children to take holidays in 
Russian, participants of the international 
Student festival FESTAS, distance learning 
programmes 
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Armenian Civic Organizations in Rostov 
 
Name of organization Type of org. 
Does org. finance 
projects in Armenia? 
To whom is money 
directed? 
Are business 
projects funded? 
Does org. fund social 
projects? 
Surb Khatch Benevolent Fund Religious/charity Yes Directly to beneficiaries  No No 
Armenian Youth Organisation Charity  Yes  
Organizes youth 
trips to Armenia  
ArmenianTheatre Theatre 
No (invites Armenians to 
Russia to perform)  Yes (theatre related) Yes (arts related) 
Nakhichevan Dioses Religious No Directly to beneficiaries No Charity 
Armenian Community of 
Rostov 
NGO, charity, 
business forum Yes 
Directly and through 
government  Yes  
Charity, renovation of cultural 
monuments, aid to 2 schools 
and occasional transfers to 
orphanage, computers to 
regional schools 
Domestic Communities based in 
Rostov region but out of Rostov 
City  
NGO, charity, 
business forum Yes 
Directly and through 
government  Yes  Charity work  
Samourgashev Brothers  
Sports club / 
charity Yes Directly to partners No Supports wrestling school 
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Appendix C 
Analysis of Short-Run Macroeconomic Impacts of Remittance Using a Structural 
Macroeconomic Model 
 
There are no less than four effects of remittances on the short-run growth of the 
economy: 
 
1. A direct effect from additional income to households (income effect), which may 
have Keynesian multiplier effects through consumption and investment; 
2. An indirect effect from increasing imports of goods as a result of their status as 
luxury goods (import substitution effect); 
3. An indirect effect that increases imports due to an appreciation of the exchange 
rate as remittances are converted to drams (exchange rate effect); and 
4. An indirect effect in the long run from a decrease in the effective labor supply 
lowers output through “brain drain” (labor supply effect). 
 
Only the first effect is positive for GDP growth, but in the short run it may dominate the 
other three effects.  The question is empirical.  Within the context of the 
macroeconometric model developed by BearingPoint for use at the Ministry of Finance, 
we may be able to disentangle each of these effects.  In its latest estimation, we are able 
to extract some plausible values for these effects. 
  
The key to whether the effects are positive or negative depends on three basic parameters 
and one value: the marginal propensities to consume and to import, the responsiveness of 
the real exchange rate to changes in the current account, and the size of remittances 
themselves.  Algebraically the question is to decide the direction of inequality in this 
expression 
 
θωθφθβ +++><++ ))(1())(1( RXRX  
 
where β is the marginal propensity to consume, θ the reaction of the real exchange rate to 
changes in the current account balance, R is remittances, φ is the marginal propensity to 
import, ω is the reaction of imports to changes in the real exchange rate, and X is a 
placeholder for a collection of other terms determined to be greater than zero, as are all 
other terms.  The term on the left-hand side is the size of the income effect, and the two 
terms on the right are the import substitution and exchange rate effects, respectively.  If 
the left-hand side term is greater, then the income effect dominates and remittances 
improve the local economy in the short-run.  If the left hand side is smaller than the sum 
of the other two, remittances reduce GDP in the short-run. 
 
The BearingPoint (BP) model makes some estimates of the parameters in this model.  
Estimates of the Armenian economy conducted this summer with quarterly data, 
evaluated at means over the 1995-2003 period, imply a short-run marginal propensity to 
consume of about 0.35 and a long-run MPC of 0.72.  BP however includes a marginal 
propensity to invest in the equation, which is evaluated to be about 0.35.  In terms of the 
model above that should be added to MPC to give a value for β in the short and long run 
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of 0.7 and 1.07.  The marginal propensity to import is estimated to be about 0.69.  This 
strikes one as a little high but intuitively it is sensible.  An increase in demand in the 
short-run probably does not induce a sharp response from domestic production since the 
economy is still in restructuring.  Most of the response is instead coming from imports, 
with domestic producers responding with a lag.  In the short run, then, the income and 
import substitution effects almost offset each other, but in the long run the income effect 
is larger than import substitution if these parameter estimates are taken as correct. 
 
The larger question, then, is the size of the exchange rate effect.  The BP model estimates 
that a 1% change in the real effective exchange rate changes imports by 3.9%.  Likewise, 
a one percent improvement in the current account balance improves the real effective 
exchange rate by about 0.08%.  Again evaluating at mean values for the variables over 
the 1995-2003 period gives values θ = 0.11 and ω = 1.57.  The effect of movements of 
the real exchange rate on imports are quite pronounced in Armenia, but the real exchange 
rate does not appear to be highly sensitive to movements in the current account balance.  
The exchange rate effect of remittances is the product of these two numbers, or about 
0.18.  In the short-run then, an increase in remittances leads to both an exchange rate 
appreciation and a sharp increase in imports that more than offsets the first effects of 
remittances on income.  GDP will fall, even though incomes will be rising and 
households may feel better off as they consume more imports.  In the long run, however, 
the income effect may be enough to offset both of the other effects.  A $1 increase in 
remittances in the long run increases GDP by $1.07 - $0.69 - $0.18 = $.20.   
 
This does not, of course, account for the labor supply effect, which may be substantial 
nor does it necessarily capture all of the movements within these three effects.  We did 
not, for instance, allow remittances to have any different effect on investment in Armenia 
than, say, an increase in government spending.  And as the Armenian economy continues 
to improve the size of the import effect will likely decrease as production is better able to 
expand to meet the new demand from increased remittances.  Nonetheless, for the present 
time the effects of remittances on the macroeconomy are complex and ambiguous.  
 
 
 
 
